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RECONSIDERING THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
EXCLUSION IN SECTION 1 OF
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT: CORRECTING THE
JUDICIARY'S FAILURE OF
STATUTORY VISION
Jeffrey W. Stemper
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act (the Act),' seeks to eliminate centuries of
perceived judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements.2 The Act made written
arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce specifically enforceable.3 It
also provided a procedural structure for enforcing awards,4 which were protected
through deferential judicial review. The Act intended to have a wide reach,6
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1977, University of Minnesota, J.D., 1981, Yale
Law School. Special thanks to Bill Eskridge, Bailey Kuklin, Ann McGinley, Gary Minda and Marjorie
Silver for commenting on ideas for and drafts of this article. Nancy London and Mark Kornfeld
provided valuable research assistance while Regina Esquilin dealt with tangible production. This
project was supported by a Brooklyn Law School summer research stipend.
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988). The Act was passed on February 12, 1925 and took effect January
1, 1926. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). It has not been amended
in substance since that time although slight wording changes occurred in 1948. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15. The
1988 amendments, which took affect March 1, 1989, strengthened the Act by making immediately
appealable judicial orders refusing to stay litigation or compel arbitration. Id. at § 15. At common law,
such orders were regarded as interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See Neal v. Hardee's Food
Sys., 918 F.2d 34, 36-37 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1959); Cohen & Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Act,
12 VA. L. REV. 265, 270 (1926); Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Public Policy Exception to
Arbitrabiity, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ. 261, 271-74 (1991); Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L REV. 132, 134 (1934).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (section 2 also states that arbitration agreements may be challenged and set aside
upon grounds available at law or equity for the revocation of contracts generally).
4. See id. § 3 (providing for stay of judicial proceedings where subject matter of dispute is within
scope of arbitration clause); id. § 4 (providing for court orders enjoining recalcitrant party to participate
in arbitration).
5. See id. § 9 (providing means for having court enter judgment upon arbitration award so that
arbitration winner may utilize full range of judgment creditor remedies); id. § 10 (permitting arbitration
award to be set aside only on basis of narrow grounds of evident bias, fraud, or decision exceeding
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employing a broad definition of commerce7 that has presumably grown in breadth
along with the expansion of judicial notions of commerce.' Although courts
applied the Act in tentative and cautious fashion9 until the 1960's, 0 arbitration
scope of submission). In addition, the Act sets forth more technical procedural requirements and also
provides means for judicial aid of an arbitration proceeding should the parties disagree. See, e.g., id.
§ 7 (subpoena of witnesses); id. § 5 (selection of arbitrators). For a brief comparison of arbitration and
litigation see Stempel, supra note 2, at 263-69.
6. However, the Act does not itself provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). Consequently, most federal
cases invoking the Act are based on diversity jurisdiction. However, suit in state court over a contract
touching sufficiently upon interstate commerce also triggers application of the Act as substantive law.
See generally Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10-15. But see Volt Information Servs., Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989) (choice of law clause
selecting state law includes state law inconsistent with the Act).
7. Section 1 of the Act defines "commerce' as:
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another,
or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of
Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation...
9 U.S.C. § 1.
8. Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895) (holding federal commerce
power not to reach manufacturing); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,269-70 (1918) (federal child
labor law invalid exercise of Congress' commerce power as manufacturing of goods not "commerce"
unless involving transportation); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,542-51
(1935) (federal regulation of poultry grown intrastate not within commerce power as effect on
commerce was indirect) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1937)
(commerce power permits federal regulation of labor relations in steel production industry); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (upholding federal minimum wage under commerce power,
effectively overruling Hammer); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (federal agricultural
regulations valid exercise of commerce power because wheat grown would eventually cross state lines).
Although the greatest expansion of the notion of interstate commerce occurred during the New
Deal era as public opinion and the Roosevelt presidency reshaped the Court, the more expansive notion
of interstate commerce has continued to dominate. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (motel/restaurant in mid-state involved in interstate commerce because of
patrons from other states and intrastate obtainment of supplies); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
300-05 (1964) (same for mid-state barbecue); see also G. STONE, M. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEiN, M.
TUSIINEr, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 125-200 (1986) [hereinafter STONE & SEIDMAN].
One of the defects in current Section 1 jurisprudence is that the court's view of the employment
contract exception in Section 1 has not kept pace with the expanding judicial notions of interstate
commerce. See infra notes 183-205 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Rederiaktiebolaget Atianten v. Aktieselskabet Kom-Og Foderstof Kompagniet, 252
U.S. 313, 315 (1920), affig 250 F. 935 (2d Cir. 1918), aff'g 232 F. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (giving
absurdly narrow reading to textually broad arbitration in order to avoid arbitration of dispute); Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause in customer brokerage
agreement on basis of jurisdictional language in 1933 Securities Act); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,
350 U.S. 198, 202-04 (1956) (permitting state law to control and prevent arbitration); see also, Stempel,
supra note 2, at 283-334 (reviewing and criticizing "public policy" exceptions to arbitration,
especially n.54 concerning Korn-og); Sterk, Enforceability ofAgreements toArbitrate: An Examination
of the Public PoliyDefense, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 481, 507-08 (1981) (reviewing and approving public
policy exceptions). I
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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gained momentum during the 1970's n and the 1980's.12 Despite growing
judicial enthusiasm for arbitration and enhanced development of arbitrability
doctrine,13 several oddities remain: the continued presence of non-statutory
"public policy" exceptions to arbitrability;' 4 the neglected development of the
10. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1967) (ordering arbitration
of claim of fraudulent inducement to contract); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg., 363 U.S. 564,
569 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naval Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583-85 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960) [hereinafter Steelworkers
Trilogy]. Warrior & Gulf and American Mfg. dealt principally with compelling arbitration; Enterprise
Wheel focused on review of union-management arbitration awards. 363 U.S. at 598-601. Although
the Steelworkers Trilogy involved arbitration compelled pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988), the Steelworker's Trilogy's preference
for arbitration influenced adjudication under the Federal Arbitration Act as well. In fact, the
Steelworkers Trilogy is annotated under Title 9 (the Act) as well as Title 29 (the LMRA). Courts
constantly commingle the jurisprudence of labor arbitration pursuant to Section 301 and commercial
or other contractual arbitration under the Act, much to the consternation of some commentators. See,
e.g., Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an
"Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEX L. REV. 509, 514 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-20 (1972) (giving strong
endorsement of enforceability of forum selection clauses, characterizing arbitration agreement as
specialized forum selection clause); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506,510-20(1974) (compelling
arbitration of contract between U.S. company and foreign nationals notwithstanding claim of Wilko
securities exception).
12. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone., 460 U.S. at 29 (compelling arbitration, rejecting argument for
judicial abstention); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10-14 (characterizing Act as substantive federal law
applicable in either state or federal court, overriding contrary state law); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1984) (compelling arbitration of arbitrable claims despite presence of some non-
arbitrable claims in dispute); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628-
40 (1985) (refusing to find public policy exception to arbitration of antitrust claims); Shearson/Amer-
ican Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-38 (1987) (compelling arbitration of 1934 Securities
Exchange Act claim notwithstanding Wilko); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1987) (refusing
to allow specific state law to displace application of Act to wage dispute); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 479-85 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, see supra note
9, and permitting arbitration of 1933 Securities Act claims).
13. See, e.g., Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04 (permitting courts to separate defenses to arbitration
clause from defenses to remainder of contract); see Furnish, CommercialArbitration Agreements and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 317, 330 (1979) (finding Prima Paint significant
advance for treatment of commercial arbitration clauses). But see Stempel, A Better Approach to
Arbitrability, 65 TUL L. REV. 1377, 1456-59 (1991) (arguing for revision of Prima Paint to permit
initial court consideration of selected defenses challenging contract formation or unconscionable
arbitration mechanism).
14. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 283-334; Sterk, supra note 9, at 507-08. In its most recent
Arbitration Act decision, the Supreme Court appears to have continued its strong (and in my view
correct) movement away from finding any public policy exceptions to arbitrability. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652-55 (1991) (rejecting contention that Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) implicitly prohibits enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements to age discrimination claim). However, Gilmer erred badly in adopting an unrealistically
formalist view of contract consent and in implicitly restricting the employment contract exception
contained in Section 1 of the Arbitration Act. See infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
1991]
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common law bases for avoiding defective arbitration agreements; i s procedural
excesses;16 and sometimes insufficient standards of review.1
7
Perhaps the most serious but infrequently discussed glitch in Arbitration Act
jurisprudence, however, involves the employment contract exception to the reach
of the Act. Section I of the Act, in addition to defining commerce and "maritime
transactions" encompassed by the Act, provides: "[N]othing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.""'
This short, superficially simple passage is seldom examined at length in the
reported cases and continues to produce unsatisfying results concerning what
constitutes "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
15. Stempel, supra note 13, at 1397-1425. In Gilmer, the Court continued its tendency to
overlook or give short shrift to contract defenses based on lack of consent, unequal bargaining power,
adhesion, or unconscionability. 111 S. Ct. at 1655-56. The Gilmer Court (by a depressing 7-2
majority) essentially took the view that a signed adhesion contract was binding on an individual
employee who was required to sign if he wanted to work. Id. Although some of the Court's coldness
to the defense may stem from an inadequately developed record by the employee and his misplaced
emphasis on unequal bargaining power (the issue is not the employer's bargaining power but the
adequacy of plaintiff's alternatives; see Stempel, supra note 13, at 1438-42) the Gilmer Court
nonetheless sends a strong message of contract formalism.
16. For example, Section Four of the Act requires a jury trial on the question of the making of
an agreement to arbitrate where the resisting party can create a sufficient factual dispute. 9 U.S.C. §
4.
17. The narrow grounds of section 10 do not permit courts to overturn or refuse to enforce a
clearly erroneous arbitration award. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
18. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
19. Id. Most recently, in Gilmer, the Court avoided a forthright discussion of the impact of
Section 1 by construing the required New York Stock Exchange application that must be completed
in order to work at a member firm (and which contains a broad arbitration clause) not to be a "contract
of employment" since the document is not bilateral between employer and employee. 111 S. Ct. at
1651-52 n.2. Although the Gilmer majority saw this as flowing from the "plain language' of the
statute, 111 S. Ct. at 1651-52 n.2, this holding seems more grounded in the Court's excessive contract
formalism. Justice Stevens' dissent better describes what happened. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1659
("the Court too narrowly construes the scope of the exclusion').
A brief historical example further illustrates the traditionally weak jurisprudence surrounding
Section 1. Some courts once held that the interstate commerce provisions of Sections 1 and 2 had no
bearing on Section 3 of the Act, which authorizes courts to stay litigation pending the completion of
arbitration concerning the matter at issue. See, e.g., Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester
Serv. Corp., 70 F.2d 297, 298 (2d Cir. 1934), afj'd on other grounds, 293 U.S. 449 (1935); Watkins
v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 1945); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,
77 F. Supp. 364, 377 (D. Neb. 1948). These courts took the extraordinary position that Section 3,
which speaks of court power in "any suit" is not subject to the Section 1 employment exception
because Section 3 does not contain the word "commerce'. See Watlins, 151 F.2d at 321; Lewittes &
Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). This position also
authorized courts to stay litigation even where the contract containing the arbitration clause bore no
relation to interstate commerce, the constitutional anchor legitimizing the Act. Lewittes & Sons, 95
F. Supp at 854. Mercifully, this seemingly daft view was persuasively rejected by other circuit courts.
See, e.g., Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 882 (6th Cir. 1944) (Section 1 is a definitional section
that must apply to a entire act to have any meaning); International Union of United Furniture Workers
v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948). It was not finally laid to rest
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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The clouded case law of Section l's employment contract exception presents
an opportunity to improve the fairness and function of the Arbitration Act, an
opportunity the bench has failed to grasp for nearly a half-century. Part II of this
article reviews the case law surrounding the judicial construction of what
constitutes a "class of workers engaged in interstate commerce," with courts
generally holding that the employment contract exception affects only workers
directly involved in interstate movement of objects. This view fails to further the
overall goals of the Act and undermines the judicial goal of fairness. Recently,
the Supreme Court perpetuated the poor judicial performance interpreting Section
1 by giving the term "contract of employment" an unduly narrow construction.
Part III briefly reviews the major approaches to statutory interpretation and then
demonstrates the persuasiveness, according to virtually each approach, of a
construction of Section 1 that defines a broader group of workers "engaged in
commerce" and a more realistic notion of what constitutes a "contract of
employment." Part IV discusses the advantages of this interpretation over the
currently prevailing view. In short, Section 1 has been and continues to be poorly
interpreted. This shortcoming I attribute to the judiciary's lack of statutory vision
in failing to grasp opportunities for more pragmatic construction that furthers both
the objectives of the Arbitration Act and the overall goals of the legal system.
II. SECrION 1 CASE LAW ON THE EXCEPTION FOR "WORKERS
ENGAGED IN COMMERCE"
A. The Restrictive Commerce Test
The issue of defining the types of workers which come within Section l's
exclusion from the Arbitration Act commerce clause was contested until the mid-
1950's. Since then, the bulk of opinion has applied the exception only to workers
directly involved in interstate movement of physical objects.21 Two circuit courts
until Bernhardt where the Supreme Court stated:
Sections 1, 2, and 3 are integral parts of a whole. To be sure, Sec. 3 does not repeat the
words "maritime transaction" or "transaction involving commerce", used in Secs. 1 and
2. But Sees. 1 and 2 define the field in which Congress was legislating. Since Sec. 3 is
a part of the regulatory scheme, we can only assume that the "agreement in writing" for
arbitration referred to in Sec. 3 is the kind of agreement which Sees. 1 and 2 have brought
under federal regulation. There is no intimation or suggestion in the Committee Reports
that Secs. 1 and 2 cover a narrower field than Sec. 3. On the contrary, [the legislative
history] states that Sec. 1 defines the contracts to which 'the bill will be applicable.'
350 U.S. 198, 201 (references omitted).
20. See Gilmer, 111 S. CL at 1651-52.
21. See infra notes 28-81 and accompanying text.
1991]
HeinOnline -- 1991 J. Disp. Resol. 263 1991
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
revisited but did not disturb the issue during the 1970's.22 The 1980's saw
several decisions interpreting the exception, most adopting the traditional view.
21
Initial application of the exclusion was implicit. For example, in Internation-
al Union of United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.,2 the
court applied the Section 1 exception to a union of woodworkers who were
themselves not crossing state lines but were making products that entered the
stream of interstate commerce.6 In a Tenth Circuit case, the Act was found
inapplicable to a union of oil production workers.2 Another case denied
compulsory arbitration of a textile workers' dispute.2
The first prominent case to take the more restrictive, now dominant, view of
the "engaged in commerce" language was Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United
Electronic Radio & Machine Workers of America' The Tenney Court denied
benefit of the employment contract exception to a union at a manufacturing plant,
finding that the group of manufacturing employees was not a class of workers
engaged in interstate commerce, notwithstanding the planned entry of their
products into interstate distribution." The court placed substantial weight on the
apparent role of the International Seamen's Union of America (the "Sailors
Union")3" in successfully promoting the exception, the text of which specifically
mentioned only seamen and railroad employees. 31 Against this backdrop, Tenney
saw the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" as necessarily meaning workers like sailors and railway workers, who
were engaged in the physical movement of goods in interstate commerce. 2
22. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162
(7th Cir. 1984) (manufacturing workers' collective bargaining agreement a contract within Section 1
but not one involving interstate commerce); Malison v. Prudential Bache Secs., 654 F. Supp. 101, 104
(W.D.N.C. 1987) (broker frequently making interstate phone calls and securities transactions not
engaged in interstate commerce under Section 1); Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. ASEA, A.B., 657 F.
Supp. 1253, 1256 (1987) (repairers of equipment used to manufacture goods entering stream of
commerce not within Section 1).
24. 168 F.2d 33; see infra notes 211-17 and accompanying text (discussion regarding status of
collective bargaining agreements).
25. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d at 36.
26. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980, 982 (10th Cir. 1951).
27. Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 108 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Del. 1952).
28. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
29. Id. at 452-53.
30. At the risk of being slightly inaccurate (the union called itself a union of "Seamen'), I have
made the short reference for the union into "Sailors Union" to make the term nonsexist. Both women
and men may work as sailors.
31. 9 U.S.C. §1.
32. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452. Said the court:
We think that the intent of the latter language was, under the rule of ejusdem generis [the
latin term for the canon of statutory construction "it is known from its associates'], to
include only those other classes of workers who are likewise engaged directly in
commerce, that is, only those other classes of workers who are actually engaged in the
movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to
(Vol. 1991, No. 2
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In particular, the court relied on the latin canon of statutory construction
ejusdem generis ("it is known by its associates")3' elevating it to the status of a
"rule." 34 The Tenney court's fixation on the ejusdem generis tool illustrates the
low level of interpretative insight that has plagued Section 1. Although perhaps
more revered during the 1950's, rigid application of any of the latinized canons
of construction has long troubled informed lawyers. As the authors of a leading
casebook bluntly observe "almost everybody thinks the canons are bunk."35
However, these same authors also note that "almost everybody-judges, lawyers,
law professors--seems to use the canons to support their interpretations."36 As
one critic of the canons has noted, by use of the canons, "judicial opinions
continue to pretend far more often than they should that the interpretation of
statutes is the mechanical application of well understood interpretative princi-
ples-the canons-to legislative materials."
37
The contradiction undoubtedly results from a tendency to marshall all
possible arguments, even the weak ones, in support of a position. Under apt
circumstances, the canons, or more precisely, the notions underlying the canons,
can assist interpretation.' However, the canons can also operate in aid of
dangerous subterfuge, especially when elevated to a mechanical formula for
decision. The crucial moment attending their use is selection of the canon.
Usually, a diametrically opposed canon or argument is available for application.39
Consequently, use of a canon as anything more than a rebuttable presumption to
form a trial hypothesis can easily lead to error by drawing courts away from a
careful reading of statutory text, legislative history, social context, and congressio-
be in practical effect part of it.
Id.; accord Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 148 F. Supp. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ('The
workers involved in this case are not in a transportation industry. Accordingly, the United States
Arbitration Act is properly applicable.").
33. See supra note 32.
34. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452.
35. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRIcKEY, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: CASES AND
MATERALS 639 (1988).
36. Id.
37. Posner, Classroom Statutory Interpretation: In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
Cmn. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (1983).
38. See R. DICIEsON, T1i INTERPRErAION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 228 (1975) (canons
serve as "useful presumptions of supposed actual legislative intent . . . modestly useful [for
determining] legislative meaning.').
39. See Llwellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision & the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (ejusdem generis canon can
always be countered, at least in theory, because "[g]eneral words must operate on something.' Further,
ejusdem generis is only an aid in getting the meaning and does not warrant 'confining the operations
of a statute within narrower limits than were intended.").
1991]
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nal purpose.' Even when rendering correct results, decision by canon rote is a
primitive approach to statutes.
41
The Tenney court also placed substantial emphasis on the slight differences
in language between the Section 1 employment exclusion and other portions of the
Act.42 The employment exclusion refers to workers "engaged" in interstate
commerce while Section 2 makes the Act applicable to transactions "evidencing
a transaction involving" interstate commerce.' Tenney read Section 2 as broader
in that one can be part of something involving commerce while stopping short of
being engaged in commerce." The court then implicitly concluded that since the
Section 1 language was seemingly narrower than that of Section 2, Congress must
have intended that the Section 1 employment exception not reach every employee
involved in transactions otherwise covered by the Act.45 This view, of course,
ignores the legislature's often random choice of roughly synonymous language4
and completely overlooks the broad purpose of the Act, which sought to achieve
judicial enforcement of commercial arbitration but was at best leery of similarly
relentless enforcement of labor arbitration agreements.47 The court also referred
to the restrictive definition of interstate commerce prevailing in 1925. '4
40. Even scholars who found Karl lwellyn's realist sarcasm overstated and defended the canons,
cautioned that the canons were at best indicators of correct interpretation rather than a formula for
rendering interpretation. For example, Hart & Sacks stated:
[Llwellyn's criticism] involves a misunderstanding of the function of the canons .... Of
course, there are pairs of maxims susceptible of being invoked for opposing conclusions.
Once it is understood that meaning depends upon context and that contexts vary, how
could it be otherwise? Maxims should not be treated, any more than a dictionary, as
saying what meaning a word or group of words must have in a given context. They
simply answer the question whether a particular meaning is linguistically permissible, if
the context warrants it.
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1221 (tent. ed. 1958).
41. The Tenney dissent characterized, probably unfairly, the use of the ejusdem generis canon as
the *sole reason advanced for this attempted construction" (that workers manufacturing goods for
interstate shipment were not within Section l's employment contract exception). 207 F.2d at 458. In
fact, the Tenney majority made use of (poor) textual analysis, (overdrawn) legislative history, and
(misplaced) congressional purpose arguments as well. Nonetheless, the dissent as well as the majority
illustrate the undue importance attached to the ejusdem generis canon in Tenney. Id.
42. Id. at 454.
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
44. See Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453.
45. Id.
46. See W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 23-46 (2d ed.
1984) (noting effect of role in drafting by different committees, staff, floor amendment in fostering use
of different words in legislative text); see also J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC
POLICIES (1984); Cohen, March & Oisen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN.
LQ. 1 (March 1972) (describing Congress as an organized anarchy, where power, tasks, and quality
control is widely dispersed).
47. See Stempel, supra note 13, at 1380-83; infra note 175 and accompanying text.
48. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453. On this point, at least, the Tenney court was clearly applying what
one scholar has termed the "archeological' approach to statutory construction by attempting to "unearth
and enforce the original intent or expectations of the legislature that created the statute." Eskridge,
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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The Tenney dissent noted contrary case law and argued that Congress sought
the Act to apply only to commercial arbitration matters. 9 The dissent's use of
legislative history is at least as plausible as that of the majority. The dissent is
most powerful in implicitly criticizing the majority as belonging to an originalist
school of statutory construction rather than one that permits evolution of the
statute according to other changes in the legal topography 0 Persuasively, the
dissent argued that "[t]o suggest that the 1925 concept of interstate commerce
should restrict the exclusionary language of the Act in 1953 is unrealistic ... we
need not now be bound by the older view."51
Despite some division of the en banc Third Circuit and substantial arguments
on both sides of the dispute, the approach of the Tenney majority gained favor,
aided substantially by its adoption in the Second Circuit case of Signal-Stat Corp.
v. Local 475, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.52 In Signal-Stat
Judge Jerome Frank, writing for the majority, cast something of a tiebreaking vote
bringing a majority of circuits clearly to the Tenney view.53  However, the
Signal-Stat opinion is terse, merely reiterating the Tenney rationale and citing to
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA.
L. REV. 275, 275 (1988); see infra notes 124-51 and accompanying text (discussing various schools
of statutory interpretation). The Tenney majority did not explain, of course, its preference for an
archeological approach to Section 1 but apparently not for Section 2.
49. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 455 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 458-59 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting); see Eskridge, supra note 48, at 275 (describing
archeological approach); Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. LJ. 1361, 1385 (1988)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents] (describing evolutive approach, which Professor
Eskridge has also championed as "dynamic" statutory interpretation). See generally Eskridge, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Interpreta-
tion].
51. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 458. The dissent also argued that the employment exclusion had been
implicitly updated by Congress when it re-tnacted the Act and codified it in 1947 without providing
for a narrower definition of interstate commerce than that prevailing after the post-New Deal Supreme
Court cases. Id. at 459.
52. 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cit. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852
(1957).
53. Id. at 302. Judge Frank, without benefit of citation, characterized the Fifth Circuit as taking
a broad view of the "engaged in interstate commerce" language shared by the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text, but saw the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits as
adopting a more restrictive view. Signal-Stat, 235 F.2d at 302. My own count as of 1956 (including
Signal-Stat) was two circuits (the Fourth and the Tenth) favoring a broad construction with perhaps
four circuits (the First, Second, Third, and Sixth) taking the narrow view. See supra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers,
Local Union No. 327, 217 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir. 1954); Local 205, United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85, 98 (Ist Cir. 1955). 1 can find no reported Fifth
Circuit precedent as of 1956 on the "engaged in commerce" point. When the First Circuit most
squarely took the restrictive view in Dickstein v. duPont it relied upon Tenney and Signal-Stat. 443
F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
Signal-Stat was important in that the Second Circuit was then the most prestigious appeals court
in the country. The stature of Judges Frank and former Yale Law School dean and principal author
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Charles Clark, who joined the Signal-Stat majority, added to
the decision's influence and aided the narrow construction of the employment contract exception.
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the Second Circuit's Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.5 opinion, which was reversed
on other grounds.
The Second Circuit's discussion of the scope of the "any other class of
workers in commerce" language of Section 1 also utilized what might be styled
the "Marxist-Leninist" interpretation of Section 1. Writing for the court, Judge
Frank stated that Bernhardt, a salesman, was not a "worker"s (something that
would have surprised Willie Loman and others who have labored in the vineyard
of sales work).5 7 Said the court:
The words "any other class of workers", read in connection with the
immediately preceding words show an intention to exclude contracts of
employment of a "class" of "workers" like "seamen" or "railroad
employees." Plaintiff was not hired as a "worker" but as a plant
superintendent, at a salary of $15,000 a year, with managerial duties
fundamentally different from those of "workers. "ss
The court attempted to buttress this strained analysis by noting that plaintiff
Bernhardt, who was also held to be ineligible for the employment contract
exception, might have shouldered management responsibilities for the defendant
company, 9 and that the California courts had taken a similar approach to
interpreting the exception in that state's arbitration law for "contracts pertaining
to labor."6°
Judge Frank's view that there existed a bright line between management
("bosses") and labor ("workers") could be justified by reference to the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)61 and its attempt to categorize employees according
their primary loyalties in the event of a workplace dispute.62 There is, in such
54. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201-02 (holding right to court access substantive rather than procedural
under Erie doctrine and holding Section 3 stay proceedings subject to Section 1 employment contract
exclusion); see also supra notes 5-10, 20 and accompanying text; cf. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12
(implicitly overruling Bernhardt in holding Act to create substantive federal law not subject to Erie
considerations).
56. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic, 218 F.2d at 951.
57. See A. MiLLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN (1952).
58. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic, 218 F.2d at 951-52 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 952 n.3.
60. Id. at 952 (citing Kerr v. Nelson, 7 Cal. 2d 85, 88, 59 P.2d 821, 823 (1936) (sales manager's
contract is not one pertaining to labor); Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 692, 697, 104 P.2d 770,
773 (1940) (collective bargaining agreement between garment workers union and garment manufacturer
not contract pertaining to labor); Universal Pictures Corp. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 2d 490, 495,
50 P.2d 500, 501 (1935) (movie actor's contract not one pertaining to labor)). The California courts
have a somewhat sfronger textual claim for distinguishing among types of workers. The word "labor"
connotes to most people a more physical activity. "Employment' or "work', the nouns actually touched
upon the text of Section 1, lack such physical connotations. While active laborers are almost always
employed or working, not all employed persons are laborers.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-52 (1988).
62. Id. § 152.
[V/ol. 1991, No. 2
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instances, a difference between labor and management. 3 However, the Arbitra-
tion Act is a separate statute, applies in different circumstances, and was designed
for a purpose quite distinct from that of the NLRA." In addition, the legislative
history of the Act gives no support to the suggestion that the term "workers" in
the Act should be construed congruently with the connotation acquired in NLRA
cases." Since the Act preceded the NLRA, there could be no evidence of
congressional support for this view. Judicial support like that of Judge Frank is
simply an inapt analogy: a middle manager may identify with the company during
a strike but she is just as likely to have an individual employment dispute with the
company over pay, benefits, promotion, discrimination or working conditions.
In essence, Judge Frank, like Judge Mars in Tenney, applied the canon
ejusdem generis as a rather rigid rule of decision. Frank, like Mars, saw Section
1 as setting forth a list of similar occupations. To both judges, sailors and railroad
workers connoted laborers. Therefore, according to their implicit syllogism, the
open-ended noun "workers" was confined to employees in occupations similar to
those of sailors and railroad workers, i.e., physical labor as part of physical
interstate transit of materials. In my view, these distinguished judges committed
several unforced errors. There was no reason (certainly no need) to attempt to
harmonize the NLRA and the Arbitration Act; the language of Section 1 does not
require such a narrow view of similarity, even when applying the ejusdem generis
canon. They gave little reflection regarding the overall purpose of the employ-
ment contract exclusion, perhaps because they focused on textual similarity.
Finally, use of the ejusdem canon naively assumes a congressional purpose in
using particular text when the language may have in fact resulted from mere
coincidence or a desire to accommodate a particular interest group (the Sailors
Union in the case of the Section 1 exception).
Judge Frank's characterization of the exception suffers from a practical defect
as well. In effect, Signal-Stat read the words exempting "seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" in Section 1 as referring to the nature of the individual employee's
activity at the job site rather than the type of work done by employees general-
ly.66 The fallacy of this view seems almost unavoidable: if Congress had
intended this approach, ordinary sailors would be within the exception but the first
mate would not, because he has some supervisory responsibility. Similarly,
railroad foremen would be bound to arbitrate under the Act but their crews would
not. Section l's text and legislative history fail to support this differentiation.
63. See R. GoRMAN, LABOR LAW § 7 (1976).
64. The NLRA sought to establish groundrules for the fair and orderly resolution of disputes
between labor and management. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-60. The Arbitration Act, passed primarily at the
behest of commercial interests, sought to ensure the specific enforcement of consensual predispute
arbitration agreements. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (discussing slim legislative history of the Act).
66. Signal-Stat, 235 F.2d at 302.
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For nearly twenty years after Signal-Stat and Tenney, cases lack significant
discussion of the employment contract exception.67 Although the courts of the
1970's that returned to the issue could have reached for precedent which took a
broad definition of workers engaged in commerce, they did not, despite
intervening legal developments that argued for a broader reading of the term. 68
The First Circuit's Dickstein v. duPont" opinion adopted the rationale of the
Tenney majority in the case of a stockbroker seeking to avoid the arbitration clause
of his individual employment contract. 70
Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit reiterated its support for this view in
Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club,71 by briefly and unquestioningly
citing the holding of Signal-Stat which states "[S]ection 1 applied only to those
actually in the transportation industry" 72 thereby the Erving court held that even
the instant plaintiff, high-flying basketball star Julius Erving, did not qualify for
the defined exception." As in Tenney and Signal-Stat, the authors of Dickstein
and Erving were well respected jurists, adding subtle weight to the precedent. 74
Thus emerged an apparent modem rule of Section 1 finding only interstate
transit workers protected by the employment contract exception. No reported
opinions since have forced serious rethinking of this view. Several late 1980's
cases addressed Section 1, but most involved the United States Postal Service, a
group viewed by most courts as sufficiently involved in interstate transportation
to make the exception applicable.75 As one court observed: "[i]f any class of
67. One circuit case from the 1960's approved the narrow construction of Tenney and Signal-Stat
but gave the issue even less thoughtful review than the other cases taking the narrow view. See Pietro
Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Optical Eng'rs, Local No. 150, 351 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir.
1965).
68. See infra notes 183-205 and accompanying text.
69. 443 F.2d 783.
70. ld. at 785. The Dickstein court stated that "[c]ourts have generally limited this exception, to
employees, unlike appellant, involved in, or closely related to, the actual movement of goods in
interstate commerce" and cited only Tenney and Signal-Stat for support of this generality. Id.
71. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
72. Id. at 1069.
73. Ild. The Erving court also relied on the First Circuit's Dickstein opinion. Id. In addition, both
district court opinions in Dickstein and Erving had followed Tenney and Signal-Stat in rejecting
plaintiff's claims of an employment contract exception. Dickstein, 320 F. Supp. at 152-53; Erving v.
Virginia Squires, 349 F. Supp. at 719. Implicitly, the contemporaneous Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall
& Coe, Inc., fits with the 1970s revival of this view of Section 1, although Legg, Mason did not focus
on the employment contract exception. 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (D.D.C. 1972) (enforcing arbitration
provisions in stockbrokers' job contracts).
74. Dickstein was written by Judge Frank Coffin while Erving was written by Judge Harold
Medina, a strong advocate for arbitration. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 406 (Medina,
J.) ("One of the dark chapters in legal history concerns [insufficient judicial solicitude for] the validity,
interpretation and enforceability of arbitration agreements").
75. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 470-73
(11th Cir. 1987); Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1988).
Mercifully, neither of these courts have attempted to resurrect the "worker-management" distinction
invoked by Signal-Stat (e.g., finding letter carriers but not inspectors within the exception) although
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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workers is engaged in interstate commerce, it is postal workers."76 Another
noted that postal employees "are responsible for dozens, if not hundreds, of items
of mail moving in 'interstate commerce' on a daily basis. Indeed, without them,
'interstate commerce,' as we know it today, would scarcely be possible.""
Notwithstanding the neither "snow, nor rain, nor heat nor gloom of night"
rhetoric?' of the postal services cases, their results suggest a substantial infirmity
in the Tenney line of cases (explored at greater length in Part III, infra) and
perhaps an inconsistent broadening of the restriction of the exclusion. The postal
service cases quickly concluded that postal workers are more like sailors and
railroad workers than they are like stockbrokers, basketball players, woodworkers,
assemblers, and other manufacturers. 79 To my mind, this categorization is not
so obvious. More likely, postal workers lie between the previously classified
groups.
At one end of the spectrum are sailors or airline pilots. Ships on navigable
waterways and commercial airliners are virtually always in the course of
transporting matter between states or countries. Not only is the aggregate work
performed by these groups important to interstate commerce but the bulk of sailors
and airline workers are in fact involved in interstate commerce. Railroad workers
are closer in on the spectrum. Many of them work only at a switchyard within a
given state.80 Although they are links in a chain of transportation commerce,
railroad workers are essentially local employees. The same can be said of a local
letter carrier in Lincoln, Nebraska, although other postal workers constantly move
mail across state lines. Unlike the sailor, pilot, or railroad worker, the letter
carrier's link to interstate commerce is more attenuated. Virtually every item
loaded by the stevedore sails to another jurisdiction, but much of the letter
carrier's work is purely local or intrastate and can hardly be said to have entered
it is not clear from the job titles of the litigants whether either of these cases presented an opportunity
to apply this analysis.
76. Bacashihua, 859 F.2d at 405.
77. American Postal Workers Union, 823 F.2d at 473. In another Section 1 case, the district court
sensibly held that the use of repair personnel to service industrial equipment did not make the sale of
the equipment a "contract of employment" under Section 1. See Great Nekoosa, 657 F. Supp. 1253,
1256.
78. The full quotation reads: "not snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night stays these couriers
from the swift completion of their appointed rounds." In what many modem customers must view as
supreme irony, it is found inscribed on the main post office in New York City. See Sportique
Fashions, Inc. v. Sullivan, 597 F.2d 664, 665 (9th Cir. 1979). The quoted sentiment is first found in
Herodotus (Book VIII) 98 (date uncertain). See Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.7d 1002, 1017 (St Cir.
1978).
79. Bacashihua, 859 F.2d at 403-05; American Postal Workers Union, 823 F.2d at 473.
80. The same is of course true regarding airline ground crews. However, the airplane serviced
by ground crews is far more certain to cross state lines than an individual train or postal truck.
Consider, for example, commuter railroads surrounding Chicago, Boston, and New York. Many never
leave their state of origin.
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the stream of interstate commerce merely because the postal system as a whole is
important to commerce."'
In any event, in the postal service cases, the courts have begun to leave the
traditional transportation industry altogether. Perhaps they should go further. If
the interstate nature of mail service as a whole places the letter carrier in Lincoln,
Nebraska within the employment exception of Section 1, one might ask why the
stockbroker trading shares by phone throughout the country, the maker of products
shipped around the world, and Dr. J. (who during his illustrious career spent eight
months each year dunking across the country) are not also covered by Section 1.
They may not be transportation workers, but their role in interstate commerce
seems at least as prominent as that of ship, rail or postal workers. Part III
addresses whether prominent schools of statutory interpretation can support this
arbitrary division of the employment exception.
B. Gilmer: Shifting from a Restrictive Commerce Test to a Restrictive
Definition of Contract
Recently, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 the Supreme Court
broke its 65-year silence regarding the scope of the Section 1 employment
exclusion. The Court granted certiorari in Gilmers" regarding whether an
arbitration agreement contained in an employment contract may be enforced to
remove from federal court an employee's claim pursuant to the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA).84 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the arbitration
clause was enforceable, 5 basing its decision solely on its conclusion that ADEA
did not implicitly limit the reach of the Act.M
81. In this sense, the wheat grown by the farmer in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(perhaps the height of expansive interpretation of the commerce clause, see STowE & SEIDMAt, supra
note 8, at 176-77), can be seen as more interstate than much of the mail. Wheat prices are largely set
by trading activity at a few exchanges (Chicago, Minneapolis, Kansas City) and wheat is quickly,
constantly, and almost unavoidably commingled so that one is hard pressed to say that Farmer Jones's
bushel grown in South Dakota did not go into the flour milled in Minnesota that went into the bread
baked in Illinois. By contrast, one can be considerably more certain that the letter Farmer Jones, who
lives in Huron, S.D., sent to his city slicker brother in Sioux Falls, S.D. never left the state.
82. 111 S. Ct. 1647.
83. 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990) (cerL granted).
84. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 and Supp. 1986).
85. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 203 (4th Cit. 1990). Robert Gilmer,
a long-time stock broker, was hired by Interstate/Johnson Lane as a manager of financial services. As
a condition of his employment, he was required to register with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
as a securities representative. Id. at 196. The NYSE in turn required that he consent, through his
written application, to arbitrate any controversy arising out of his employment. Id. The trial court,
reversed by the Fourth Circuit, had agreed with Gilmer that ADEA implicitly exempted ADEA claims
from the reach of the Arbitration Act. Id.
86. Id. at 199-201. The Gibner panel's view conflicted with that of most courts considering the
issue. See, e.g., Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1988); Swenson
v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 143
(1989); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 1989); Utley v. Goldman Sachs &
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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The Fourth Circuit did not address the issue of the applicability of the
Section 1 exception. Neither did the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, at least
not expressly. However, several amici supporting Gilmer argued for the broader
construction of Section I as advocated in this article and contended that the issue
of the Act's applicability to employment contracts was implicitly within the scope
of the certified question! 7 Counsel for Interstate/Johnson Lane moved to strike
these portions of the amicus briefs, but the Court denied the motion.M Justice
O'Connor was sufficiently intrigued by the argument for a Section 1 exception that
she asked counsel about it during oral argument.' Subsequently, the court
granted Interstate/Johnson Lane leave to file a supplementary brief on the issue.9°
My own hope was that the Court would remand the matter to the trial court
for consideration of the employment contract exception issue as well as the issue
of whether Gilmer's consent was sufficiently voluntary to make the arbitration
agreement enforceable. Both matters are important9' and would benefit from the
viewpoints of a variety of jurists. The issue of consent is particularly fact
sensitive and logically requires district court examination and fact finding.
Although the scope of Section l's employment contract exception is almost a
purely "legal" question, it would nonetheless benefit from some degree of
"percolation" in lower courts prior to a Supreme Court pronouncement on the
issue. During the pendency of a Gilmer remand, other courts could probably face
and decide the Section 1 issue as well. When the issue returned to the Supreme
Court, the Justices would have the benefit of the thoughts of other judges, a
Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 105 (5th
Cir. 1990).
Judge Widener's dissent in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. agreed with these cases that
the purpose of eradicating discrimination underlying ADEA would be unduly compromised if
employers could enforce forum selection clauses to remove ADEA disputes from federal courts, which
were perceived as more appropriate forums for discrimination claims. 895 F.2d at 203.
Although most courts addressing this issue have framed it as one of statutory conflict, it is in
fact a part of the jurisprudence concerning whether antidiscrimination and civil rights claims should
not be arbitrable as a matter of public policy. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 283-331. On this
question, the Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court Gilmer opinions correctly decided that ADEA and
general judicial solicitude for such claims should not preclude application of an on-point federal statute
(the Act) requiring arbitration that remains consistent with social preferences. Id. at 327-31; see infra
notes 193-206 and accompanying text (discussing dynamic statutory interpretation). However, both
Gilmer majorities overlooked the very suspect "consent" or voluntariness of Gilmer in agreeing to
arbitrate as a condition of obtaining his job, see Stempel, supra note 13, at 1395. The trial court and
the Fourth Circuit both failed to address the potential applicability of the Section 1 employment
contract exception, which was not argued by counsel.
87. See Cannon, Are Arbitration Agreements Enforceable with Respect to Claims Under the Age
Discrimination in EmploymentAct?, 1990-91 Term, PREvIEW OF U.S. SUP. Cr., CASES, FEB. 19 1991,
at 188,191 (noting that amicus briefs by AARP, the AFL-CIO, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law argued for application of Section 1 employment contract exception to Gilmer).
88. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990).
89. SeeArguments Before the Court: Employment Discrimination, 59 U.S.L. Weekly 3525,3525
(1991) (reporting questions by Justice O'Connor on this issue).
90. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 947 (1991).
91. Regarding the issue of consent see Stempel, supra note 13, at 1426-32.
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particularly important consideration where, as with Section 1, the legal issue has
not been subject to reflective judicial analysis during the past 40 years.92
Unfortunately, the Court did not take the prudential path but instead decided
a major segment of the Section 1 issue in a manner adverse to perhaps the most
widely affected group of employees. In addition, the Court implicitly suggested
it was hostile to consent-based defenses related to issues of adhesion or
unconscionability.93 In effect, employers and more powerful contracting parties
won this issue with hardly a shot having been fired. Nonetheless, the indirect
nature of the victory, in which the Court "skirted" both issues,9 suggests that
continued lower court reassessment and development of Section 1 doctrine is in
order.
The bulk of the Gilmer opinion addresses the public policy/statutory
interpretation issue of whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) precludes operation of the Arbitration Act to require arbitration of an
ADEA claim and concludes quite properly that it does not.9" The Court also
rejected plaintiff Gilmer's defenses based on contract doctrine, finding that "[m]ere
inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.""
Although Gilmer was not a long opinion, the Court's treatment of the ADEA and
contract formation issues was far deeper than its cursory semi-disposition of the
Section 1 employment contract exception issue, which the Court relegated to a
footnote. Said the Court, after quoting Section 1:
Several amici curiae in support of Gilmer argue that that section
excludes from the coverage of the FAA [the Arbitration Act] all
"contracts of employment." Gilmer, however, did not raise the issue in
the courts below, it was not addressed there, and it was not among the
92. Readers who accept my criticisms of Gibner, Tenney and Signal-Stat may argue that the scope
of Section 1 has yet to receive wise and reflective judicial consideration.
93. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1655-56.
94. See Gibner, 111 S. Ct. at 1657 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (court in Gilmer "skirts the antecedent
question of whether the coverage of the Act even extends to arbitration clauses contained in
employment contracts").
95. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652-55; Stempel, supra note 2, at 327-31.
96. Id. at 1655. Statements like these lead me to conclude that Gilmer's case was not lawyered
in an optimal manner. Instead of reaching for broad rules of prohibition, counsel for parties seeking
to avoid arbitration agreements would obtain better support from contract-based defenses if they show
that the particular litigant was forced to accept an unreasonably unfavorable contract term in order to
earn a living, or was defrauded, or was forced to sign under duress, etc.
As a general proposition, the Court is correct. Simple incantations of unequal bargaining power
should not invalidate contracts. However, where the contract concerns earning a livelihood and the
instant facts suggest no consent or low quality consent, arbitration agreements may not apply because
of factors like lack of knowledge, unfair dealing, adhesion, unconscionability, or defective agency. To
invalidate such "lifeline" contracts for work, food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, the individual
employee should not bear a heavy burden in order to prevail on one of these affirmative defenses. See
generally Stempel, supra note 13, at 1438-42.
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questions presented in the petition for certiorari. In any event, it would
be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion because the
arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of
employment. The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being
enforced be in writing. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3. The record before us
does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's employ-
ment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause.
Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registra-
tion application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not
with Interstate. The lower courts addressing the issue uniformly have
concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 of the FAA is inapplicable
to arbitration clauses contained in such registration applications. See,
e.g., Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (CA 1971); Malison v.
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 101, 104 (W.D.N.C.
1987); Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367
(D.D.C. 1972); Tonetti v. Shirley, 219 Cal. Rptr. 616, 173 Cal. App. 3d
1144 (1985); see also Stokes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
523 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1975). We implicitly assumed as much in
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987),
where we held that the FAA required a former employee of a securities
firm to arbitrate his statutory wage claim against his former employer,
pursuant to an arbitration clause in his registration application. Unlike
the dissent, see post at 1659-1660, we choose to follow the plain
language of the FAA and the weight of authority, and we therefore hold
that § 1's exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer's arbitration
agreement. Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by
amici curiae.'
I reproduce virtually the Court's entire discussion of the Section 1 issue both
because it allows scrutiny and to assure readers that I have not mischaracterized
the Court's "analysis." It is that bad." In essence, the Court said: (a) the
Section 1 issue was waived because not argued below, (b) but we are going to
decide part of it anyway, (c) by making the amazingly broad pronouncement
helpful to defendant and all brokerage houses that arbitration clauses required by
a self-regulatory organization to which the defendant employer belongs are not
within Section 1, (d) but nevertheless we refuse to render a complete examination
97. Gilmer, ill S. Ct. at 1651-52 n.2 (emphasis and italics the Court's, as is the odd,
unpunctuated citation form).
98. Some of the "cobbled together' feel of GiLner's footnote 2 may have resulted from an 'end
of Term* rush to complete opinions. However, the Gibner decision was announced on May 13, 1991,
nearly six weeks before the end of the Term. My speculative theory is that the Court gave the Section
1 issue such rough hewn consideration because there was a clear majority on the merits of the
judgment (7-2 in favor of the defendant brokerage house), the Section 1 issue was not going to be
dispositive and was, at least partially, deferred rather than decided, and the Court felt pressure to devote
its remaining six weeks to legal issues it deemed more complicated or important.
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of Section 1 that might on closer analysis help Gilmer and other employees, (e)
but many questions regarding the scope of Section 1 remain open, particularly
when an arbitration clause is found in a bilateral employer-employee contract.
In deciding Patterson v. McLean Credit Union," a thin majority of the
Court found the plain language of 42 U.S.C. section 1981 (forbidding discrimina-
tion in the "making and enforcement of contracts") to limit the statute to only
hiring decisions,"W a firestorm of criticism ensued.0 1 Congress overwhelming-
ly passed legislation to change that crabbed and tortured "plain language"
construction as well as to overrule other Court decisions narrowly construing civil
rights laws.'0 2 Although President Bush vetoed the bill (and barely warded off
an override by Congress), the Justice Department has consistently stated that it
disagreed with the Court's narrow interpretation of Patterson and that the Bush
administration would support a civil rights bill that overruled only Patterson.103
The purported "plain language" rationale of Gilmer is cut from the same cloth
as Patterson and deserves equivalent condemnation. The Court confused strict
interpretation (not extending language beyond the reach of words generally
accepted by those who speak the language) and literal interpretation (using a
precise dictionary-like application of language even where it produces absurd
results or results different from common connotative understandings of the term).
Gilmer is literalist rather than plain or strict in its construction of language.
Although plaintiff Gilmer's stock exchange application may not have been the
contract of employment between Gilmer and his employer, it was clearly a related
document essential to the formation of the employment relationship. 4 Inter-
state/Johnson Lane would not have hired Gilmer had he not completed the
application (including signature of the arbitration clause) and been approved by the
Exchange. Even with a strict view of language, most people would view the
application as one of the contract documents of Gilmer's employment.
In addition, of course, the Court's invocation of "plain language" despite the
absurdity of result provides a neat way for the Gilmer majority to avoid
99. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
100. Id. at 178-82.
101. See, e.g., A Civil Rights Symposium Honoring Judge John Minor Wisdom, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1351 (1990) (several articles highly critical of Patterson reasoning and approach); Committees on Civil
Rights, Federal Legislation, and Sex and the Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
The Civil Rights Act of 1990,45 REcORD 430, 430-35 (1990) (criticizing Patterson and other Supreme
Court decisions restricting scope of federal legislation, endorsing proposed legislation to overrule court
decisions).
102. See Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights
Game, 79 CAUF. L. REv. 613, 618 (1991); Stempel, The Rehnquist Cour Inertial Burdens, Civil
Rights, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL L. REv. 583, 645-55 (1991) (both
discussing congressional reaction to Patterson and other Court decisions adopting narrow interpretation
of civil rights laws).
103. See Stempel, supra note 102, at 652.
104. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1659 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('Gilmer was, however, required as
a condition of his employment to become a registered representative of several stock exchanges,
including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)").
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considering the other factors thought to be integral to intelligent statutory
interpretation: legislative history; specific legislative intent; overall legislative
purpose; evolutionary influences on law and society; the distribution of power
within the political system; and (in close cases) the "better" rule. As discussed
below, these factors powerfully support a broader interpretation of the Section 1
exclusion. Justices Stevens and Marshall came to that same conclusion because
they permitted themselves to review this evidence, s05 an opportunity the majority
denied itself.
Furthermore, the Court's crabbed reading of the term "contract of employ-
ment" creates a functional asymmetry in arbitration law that the Court itself
touches upon but fails to grasp. As footnote 2 observes, there is no written
arbitration clause between Gilmer and his employer.'06 Yet, when Gilmer sues,
his employer is permitted to force Gilmer into the arbitration forum on the basis
of Gilmer's signature to an arbitration agreement that, in the eyes of the Court, he
made with someone else. 07 In other words, Interstate/Johnson Lane gets to
enforce the arbitration clause of a contract it did not sign but Gilmer is not
permitted to invoke a statutory exclusion based on that same contract.
Although this result may seem reasonable to those steeped in Canon law or
the common law of the 18th Century, it seems grossly unfair by modem standards.
At a minimum, it is a clear victory for formalism over functionalism and equity.
Further reflection raises the issue of whether the Court's reasoning passes even
formalist scrutiny. To enforce an arbitration clause against Gilmer without an
arbitration agreement with Gilmer, Interstate must be a third-party beneficiary of
Gilmer's application to become a registered representative.'" Unfortunately, the
Court's backhanded way of deciding this issue under the rubric of "plain
language" prevented full (or even fragmented) development of an evidentiary
record on these matters.
The issue of third-party beneficiary status is by no means open-and-shut.
"The performance of a contract usually benefits persons other than the parties who
made it, but they cannot ordinarily enforce it.""' However, courts have
recognized a "wide variety of situations" in which persons not a party to a contract
105. See id. at 1659-60.
106. d. at 1651-52.
107. d.
108. One might also wonder whether Gilmer's application even qualifies as a contract. Of course,
most courts hold it does, but the application is hardly the sort of bargain envisioned when one thinks
of a true contract. Rather, the application is something akin to a ticket purchased by Gilmer or a
receipt given when he pays a toll to ride on the expressway. Just as the back of the ticket or receipt
may contain exculpatory language, the exchange application contained a standardized arbitration clause
that probably received only perfunctory reading from Gilmer. If this sort of "contract" is enforceable
against Gilmer in disputes arising out of his employment why is it not also considered to be a "contract
of employment?" The Court has no answer other than its strained mantra of "plain language." See
generally Stempel, supra note 13, at 1438.42 (discussing conditions for enforcing adhesion terms and
whether items like tickets qualify as contracts).
109. E. FARNSWORTi, CocrRAcTs §10.1, at 710 (1982) (citation omitted).
1991]
HeinOnline -- 1991 J. Disp. Resol. 277 1991
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
have been allowed to enforce the contract."1 The modem test adopted in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts looks to whether the non-signer seeking to
enforce a contract was an intended beneficiary and whether performance of the
contract would satisfy an obligation to the non-signer or "the circumstances
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance.""1 Although brokerage houses can probably make this
showing in cases like Gilmer, the fact remains that the Court leaped to its
conclusions without requiring a showing of entitlement to enforce the "non-
employment contract arbitration clause" against Gilmer and other plaintiffs.
Interstate and other firms undoubtedly derive some benefit from having the
Exchange screen those applying for broker positions. Since employment disputes
are usually directed at the employer rather than a self-regulatory organization like
a stock exchange, there was probably an intent that the member firm have the
benefit of the arbitration promise. However, the Exchange as its own entity would
presumably want to screen applicants (e.g., to ease pressure for further government
regulation and to preserve confidence in the Exchange) and would for its own
reasons desire arbitration clauses (e.g., to keep disputes out of the newspapers).
This may, in the context of all the facts, suggest a limit to Interstate's rights to
enforce arbitration clauses entered into with others.
If Interstate is to obtain the fruits of such asymmetric application of contract
and statutory law, it should at least shoulder the burden of persuading the Court
that it is a true third party beneficiary entitled to enforce Gilmer's arbitration
agreement with the exchange, even though Gilmer lies outside Section 1. Of
course, if Interstate is truly an intended beneficiary of Gilmer's contract with the
stock exchange, how can the arbitration agreement not come within Section 1?
Merely asking the question leads one to adopt the view of the Gilmer dissent.
In addition, the Court in footnote 2 takes maximum license with the cases it
cites for support. All of them: Dickstein v. duPont, Malison v. Prudential-
Bache,'1 2 Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe 1" and Stokes v. Merrill
Lynch 14 fail to support the Gilmer construction and result. Dickstein and Legg,
Mason give their primary focus to the issue of whether the employee plaintiffs in
question were sufficiently "engaged in interstate commerce" to benefit from the
employment exception. 5 Dickstein and Legg, Mason did not directly adopt the
narrow definition of contract used by the Gilmer Court. 1 6 To the contrary,
Dickstein found that a broker's application to the NYSE was "an integral and
mutually binding part" of the employment relation with a brokerage house.1 7
110. Id.
111. Id. § 10.3, at 717 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981)).
112. 654 F. Supp. 101, 104 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
113. 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1972).
114. 523 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1975).
115. See Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 785-88; Legg, Mason, 351 F. Supp. at 1369-71.
116. Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 785-88; Legg, Mason, 351 F. Supp. at 1369-71.
117. See Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 786.
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Legg, Mason, read fairly, makes a similar implication."' Stokes addressed only
the pre-emptive force of the Act and did not mention Section 1.119 Malison and
Tonetti, can be read as supplementing their narrow construction of the commerce
prong of Section 1 with a narrow construction of the contract within the
employment prong only through a vast interpretative leap.
The Court's invocation of its own precedent, Perry v. Thomas, is similarly
unconvincing. According to the Gilmer Court, Perry assumed that applications for
stock exchange approval to work for a member house are not contracts of
employment.1 O Perhaps. It is more likely, however, that the Perry v. Thomas
Court simply overlooked the issue of Section 1 since it was not raised in that case.
In similar fashion, the Gilmer Court would probably have overlooked the Section
1 issue (as did the Eastern District of North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit) had
it not been raised by amici curiae. To convert oversight into tacit approval hardly
strengthens the Court's position.
Further, Perry v. Thomas is not a solid jurisprudential rock on which to build
the Court's church of restrictive application of Section 1. Perry has a hurried
quality about it similar to Gilmer (Perry was decided in mid-June 1987 near the
end of that Term) and commits a major analytic flaw by suggesting that state law
should govern construction of arbitration agreements."' Reflection on that issue
should suggest to the Court that interpretation of contracts subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act be accomplished pursuant to federal common law.1' "  In
addition, the author of Perry is Justice Marshall, who joined Justice Stevens'
dissent in Gilmer. Apparently, Justice Marshall did not believe he "implicitly
assumed" the narrow construction of Section I "contracts of employment" held by
the Gilmer majority when he wrote Perry v. Thomas.
In practical effect, Gilmer renders half a decision on the Section 1 question.
By far the largest category of reported individual employee arbitration disputes
involve workers for registered brokerage houses belonging to the New York Stock
Exchange or other exchanges that insist workers sign an arbitration clause as a
condition of working in the business. Unless reconsidered or altered through
legislation, the bulk of workers who should enjoy the fruits of a more expansive
reach of Section 1 are barred from this benefit. Nonetheless, as Gilmer
acknowledges, other Section 1 issues await another day. In particular, Gilmer
permits lower courts to apply Section 1 to direct employment contracts if they find
the affected workers to be within the reach of the statutory provision.123 Part
III suggests that lower courts would act with greater fidelity to the Arbitration Act
and general principles of statutory interpretation by adopting a broad view of
Section 1.
118. See Legg, Mason, 351 F. Supp. at 1369-71.
119. See Stokes, 523 F.2d at 434-37.
120. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652 n.2.
121. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n.9.
122. I analyze Perry and make this argument in detail in Stempel, supra note 13, at 1452-55.
123. See Gilmer, 111 S. C1. at 1651 n.2.
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III. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1
A. Approaches to Statutory Interpretation
Although the groundrules of statutory interpretation are discussed as though
they were drawn from a rulebook used by all judges, the legal profession
(particularly the academy) diverges quite substantially regarding the most useful
indicia of statutory meaning. The following approaches to statutory interpretation
have substantial support in legal literature and judicial opinion: textualism;
intentionalism; purposivism; dynamism; and eclectic pragmatism. These schools
of statutory thought differ in terms of their emphasis on particular factors or
methods in resolving issues of statutory construction.
Textualism. Textualists regard the language of the statute as the primary
datum for assessing meaning, with more strident textualists taking the view that
consideration of any matter other than statutory text is illegitimate.1 '2 Less
extreme textualists nonetheless place great emphasis on the language of the statute
and argue for a "plain meaning" approach to construction; one that forbids
consideration of other sources of meaning where the statute's text is deemed
sufficiently clear.as However, the textual approach has substantial inherent
limits for resolving many cases. Much statutory language admits of no plain
meaning and requires resort to other data for interpretation." Not surprisingly,
some criticize textualism as occasionally leading only to result-oriented analysis
since one person's ambiguity is another's plain meaning.1 27
124. Professor Eskridge and others have noted that current textualist fashion differs from the
traditional "plain meaning" rule in that new textualists are both quicker to find clear meaning and less
willing to view non-textual interpretive aids as legitimate. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L REV. 621, 645-55 (1990); Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 445, 453 (1988) ('[Justice] Scalia-led [textualist] attack upon the use of legislative history"
differs from earlier concerns in vehemence, use of unsupported and incorrect factual assumptions,
admitting of little or no role for bona fide indices of legislative intent extrinsic to text); Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 277, 285 (1990).
125. See, eg., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("[w]here the language [of
a statute] is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise
and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."); Eskridge, Overruling Statutory
Precedents, supra note 50 at 1364; Note, Intent Clear Statements & the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 899 (1982).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.) ("notion that
because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplifica-
tion."); W. EsIuDGE & P. FiicKEY, supra note 35, at 590-95; S. FIsH, ISTHE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS? 1-17 (1980) (finding words alone ambiguous and to depend on context, particularly shared
views among readers, to give meaning); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISis AND REFORM 269-
70 (1985); Wald, supra note 124, at 302 ('people frequently do not say precisely what they mean").
127. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the venerable case of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), misconstrued the
meaning of the text of the eleventh amendment while purportedly taking a plain meaning approach;
utilizing legislative history to support different textual reading of amendment); see Popkin, The
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Intentionalism. A second major school of statutory construction seeks to
ascertain the intended meaning of the provision held by the legislature that enacted
the statute.se This typically involves looking at the text, legislative history of
the statute, immediate and specific goal of the enacting body, and politico-legal
climate at the time of the statute's passage.129 Although the intentionalist view,
like the textualist approach, purports to be one limiting judicial power, it differs
from the textualist view in that it regularly resorts to extrinsic aids in construction
and tends to focus on historical extrinsic material, all the while resisting attempts
to "update" a statute.'"
Purposivism. Purposivism focuses not upon the immediate and narrow
specific intent of the enacting legislature but upon the broader overall objectives
of the law in question. One can make a strong case that purposivism is the most
venerable and traditional of the interpretative approaches. It might well be
summarized by the classic English cases that posit that courts locate the "mischief
or defect" that prompted passage of the statute and discern the remedy for the
mischief embodied in the law, thereafter giving the law "such construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy [and] add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act."
131
In the modem version of this venerable "suppress the mischief/advance the
remedy" formula, courts take advantage of their institutional niche and decision-
making advantages (e.g., depoliticalization, time for reflection, application of
neutral and principled process) to effect the legislative will in a wise and fair
manner consistent, insofar as possible, with legal and political consensus. In that
sense, modem purposivism is closely associated with the legal process views of
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. 32 The Hart and Sacks view accepted
a vision of positive law through legislative supremacy but posited an important
Collaborative Model of Statutory interpretation, 61 S. CALL. REv. 541,592 n.213 (1988) ("Literalism
... is often a subterfuge for judicial activism* citing Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J.) as example); see also W. ESKRiDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 35, at 594-95 (discussing
"shifting fortunes of the plain meaning rule" and implying structural limits on its use and hegemony).
128. See, e.g., Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1976);
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989); A. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCION (1985). Although the influential Sutherland treatise has been described
as one that avoids "grand, foundationalist theories of statutory interpretation, Eskridge & Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321,324 n.7 (1990), the underlying
goal of the Sutherland approach was to implement legislative intent and it can be broadly characterized
as intentionalist in thrust. See id. at 325 n.11; Sunstein, Statutory Interpretation in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. RE'.. 405, 428-32 (1990).
129. See R. DICKERsON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPUCATION oF STATUrS 87-102 (1975);
A. SutrHERI.AND, supra note 128, § 45.05, at 20-21; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 128, at 325-26.
130. See, e.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 681-88 (1979) (court finds Congress
did not intend to reserve any easement rights in western lands granted to Union Pacific railroad and
makes reference to statutory purpose and American history to support construction, finding that
legislative materials were inconclusive); see Aleinikoff Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 20, 23-27 (1988).
131. Heydon's Case, 30 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Exchequer 1584).
132. See generally H. HART & A. SAcKs, supra note 36.
1991]
HeinOnline -- 1991 J. Disp. Resol. 281 1991
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
role for courts based not only on the gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities attendant in
a web of statutory law but also because of the perceived institutional competence
of courts.'33 Although the Hart & Sacks view of the legislative process has been
criticized," purposivism continues to exert substantial influence. 3 '
Evolutive Approaches. Adherents of evolutive or dynamic statutory
interpretation" 6 attempt to interpret a statute beginning with the meaning
intended by the legislature that drafted it but allowing meaning to evolve
according to experience with the statute, unforseen issues, and intervening legal
and political change. This approach allows for evolution in order to render a
meaning as consistent as possible with text and original intent but also one that
133. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 40, at 1190-1250; see also Eskridge & Frickey,
Legislative Scholarship & Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691,691-701
(1987); Weisberg, The Calabrisian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 216-17, 232-37 (1983).
134. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (describing interest group analysis); W.
ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 35, at 245-47 (Hart and Sacks assumed that the legislative process
is a public-seeking one and that statutes will embody rational public policy).
135. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 133, at 700-35; Sunstein, supra note 128, at 440-41
(employing notion of institutional competence to argue for more active judicial role in statutory
construction and retreat from version of legislative supremacy paradigm that makes courts too much
the agents of legislatures); see also Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 223, 250-52 (1986) (suggesting current
use of purposivism to maximize public interest interpretation of statutes insofar as permitted by
separation of powers and legislative supremacy).
In addition, a "new" legal process has emerged that both attempts to refute and respond to the
criticisms by refining the Hart & Sacks model. See, e.g., Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1032-43 (1984) (contending Constitution does not establish
interest group free-for-all for obtaining political or economic advantage through legislation); Farber &
Frickey, supra note 124, at 461-69 (arguing that many laws cannot be simply explained as interest-
group v ictories); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Clu. L. REv. 1129,1173-
74 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Private Preferences] (suggesting that legislation can change attitudes
and thus influence group and public thought as well as being product of group activity and public
opinion); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups).
The new legal process adherents argue that lawmaking is as much the ongoing product of an
interpretative community as it is isolated statutory enactments or administrative agency pronounce-
ments. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRiCKEY, supra note 35, at 333. In my view, both "old" Hart & Sacks
style legal process and the "new" legal process techniques for discerning purpose are both part of
purposivism as a school of statutory interpretation.
136. See, e.g., Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 50, at 1385; Eskridge,
Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 50. Whether using the terms dynamic, evolutive, or another word,
many have argued that judicial interpretation of law should keep pace with the times. See, e.g., Blatt,
The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form & Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799,841-
43 (1985); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 7"52-55 (1949). Much of this writing and
judicial activity, however, focused on constitutional rather than statutory updating. See Blaustein &
Field, 'Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MiCH. L. REV. 151, 167 (1958) (seeing two-
thirds (60 out of 90) of overruling opinions as involving Constitution rather than statutes); Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467, 492-93
(observing but criticizing trend).
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will fit well with other statutes, current case law, and "public values. 1 37 One
author describes his version of evolutive interpretation as a "nautical" approach in
which courts set sail on a course mapped by the legislature but adjust the voyage
in response to new information."
The evolutive approach is traditionally favored by those on the bench
regarded as "liberals" 39 and is often attacked as "judicial activism" by those
supporting the textualist or intentionalist view.1 " Nonetheless, it is a widely
137. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-43 (1982);
Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 50, at 1385; Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation,
supra note 50.
Calabresi and Eskridge differ in degree in that Calabresi advocates court authority to "overrule"
statutes when their text or extrinsic matter squarely dictates a result at odds with current legal thinking.
This is a candid but substantial change in the traditional role of courts, whose historical duty is to defer
to the legislative will, even one of an ancient legislature, so long as the command is clear. Professor
Eskridge stops short of this but urges a broad based judicial effort to render modem interpretations of
statutes even where their text or legislative history come close to compelling a different result under
the traditional legal process theory of legislative hegemony. See Zeppos, Judicial Candor and
Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. LJ. 353, 360-62 (discussing Calabresi and Eskridge, finding both
within school of dynamic interpretation).
Public values are fairly ascertainable, widely and firmly held societal beliefs (e.g., treat like cases
alike, punishment should fit the crime, individual justice matters more than technical legality) which
may legitimately influence statutory interpretation when more textual, commanding factors do not
require a contrary result. Accord Sunstein, supra note 128, at 460-62; see Eskridge, Public Values
in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1010-17 (1988).
138. See Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 57-61.
139. See R. POSNER, supra note 126, at 269 (liberals favor less fettered approach to statutory
construction in order to accomplish perceived benefits where legislature has not legislated enough).
It appears that Justice Brennan has used an evolutive approach in construing statutes. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-09 (1979) (reading Title VII, despite seeming literal
language barring race-conscious affirmative action program, to permit such programs because of
evolving views as to what means are necessary to redress race discrimination); Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 50-55 (1983) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V) to permit awards of punitive
damages, in part because of legal and social evolution easing path to recovery of punitive damages as
means of deterring and punishing legal wrongs).
140. Evolutive interpretation has been criticized as departing too greatly from the prevailing model
of legal positivism and legislative supremacy. See, e.g., Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DUM LJ. 371, 375 (use of extra-statutory information to refine statutory
meaning inconsistent with democratic theory). Among jurists, Justice Hugo Black is thought the most
illustrative proponent of this view. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
398 U.S. 235, 258 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (judicial change in interpretation usurps Congress's
legislative powers and violates article I of the Constitution); see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRuST 4-8 (1980).
Justice Brennan, as perhaps the Court's most prominent "liberal" has been the focus of much
criticism of alleged judicial activism, most of it focusing on constitutional decisions. He was author
of Boys Markets and Monell v. Department of Social Sers., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), both described by
Professor Eskridge as evolutive opinions (although he finds Monell masquerading as an originalist
opinion). See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 50, at 1390-91, 1395-96.
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accepted approach"" and is often used by judges described by themselves or
others as moderate or conservative.
142
Eclectic Pragmatism. Eclectic pragmatism involves a court's use of any of
the four previously discussed approaches (textualism, intentionalism, purposivism,
dynamism) or some combination of them in order to reach what it regards as the
correct interpretation in the case at hand. Use of "practical reasoning" in the
writings of some scholars1 43 essentially encompasses the approach I envision.
By eclectic, I mean that the statutory interpreter willingly uses insights from the
previously discussed schools, as may be apt in the individual case, to resolve a
statutory question. By pragmatic, I mean that the interpreter is more concerned
with sound and equitable case results than achieving a theoretical consistency or
advancing a world view. The task of statutory interpretation is not to render
elegant decisionmaking so much as it is to render acceptably wise and fair
decision making consistent with the prevailing political construct. Thus, although
legal theorists are hesitant to admit it, the judicial system is inherently pragmatic.
Consequently, many of the better judges consistently use eclectic pragmatism to
interpret statutes,'" which accounts for a good deal of the perceived inconsisten-
cy in statutory construction. 45 Rhetorically, the textual, intentional, and
purposive schools continue to hold sway,'4 although eclectic pragmatism may
explain more actual case results.
141. See Zeppos, supra note 137, at 412 ('What Calabresi and Eskridge have shown is that in
many cases, originalism never really served as the actual basis for deciding statutory cases. For years,
judges have been profoundly nonoriginalist in deciding cases but have used originalism as a means for
justifying their results").
142. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124-29 (1965) (Harlan, J.) (restricting use
of three-judge district court where its use would be inconsistent with modem needs); Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393-409 (1970) (Harlan, J.) (interpreting federal maritime law to
provide cause of action for wrongful death, in part due to evolutionary pattern of state laws creating
wrongful-death recovery barred at common law); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,
401-11 (1975) (Stuart, J.) (replacing old admiralty rule of even division of damages with modem
proportional fault rules); see also Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 50, at 1389
n.147.
143. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 128, at 323.
144. See id. at 321-22 ("Judges' approaches to statutory interpretation are generally eclectic, not
inspired by grand theory, and this is a good methodology... [W]e find an underlying coherence in
the Supreme Court's practices of statutory interpretation."); Posner, Legislation and its Interpretation:
A Primer, 68 NEa. L REv. 431, 450 (1989) (pragmatic approach "taken by the best judges, and it is
thus an attainable ideal.").
145. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 128, at 345-50, 364-78 (finding aspects of practical
reasoning model in several recent United States Supreme Court cases but incorrectly applied or
hindered by Court's reluctance to discuss with candor practical reasoning factors, especially evolutive
aspects).
146. See id. at 324-25 (labeling these theories "foundationalist' in that "each seeks an objective
ground ('foundation') that will reliably guide the interpretation of statutes in all situations."). Although
less rigidly replicable and less concerned with the limits of judicial power, the evolutive or interest
group approaches could also be characterized as foundationalist in that each also suggests that its result
be employed, or at least consulted, in every case, even where statutory text or legislative intent and
purpose is clear.
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Related to the presence of eclectic idea borrowing is the considerable degree
of overlap among the various schools, in particular the presence of two or more
statutory schools seemingly competing for the hearts and minds of individual
scholars or judges. The interpretative views of judges can change over time. 47
Similarly, the emphasis of scholars can shift.14 Prominent judicial proponents
of particular statutory schools can frequently be found employing other schools of
analysis. For example, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor as well as Chief Justice
Rehnquist are often seen as textualist 49 but also invoke legislative background
materials to bolster an originalist and or purposivist ° approach to decisions.
Justice Brennan's opinions often marshalled almost every major school to support
his disposition of the matter.151
A postscript. In addition, there exist less mainstream approaches to statutory
construction that urge a less restrained approach by the judiciary. Scholars have
identified a separate school of "free inquiry" statutory interpretation used in
continental Europe,"5 2 but few in the United States argue for completely
147. See Posner, supra note 126, at 434.
Legislation scholarship has become cacophonous. I admit to having contributed to the
noise. In a series of articles written mainly in the 1970s I pushed the economic interest-
group line hard . . . More recently I proposed renewed reliance on the method of
imaginative reconstruction; more recently still, I suggested a command theory of
interpretation; still more recently ... a pragmatic approach. (emphasis in original).
Id.
148. Compare Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 50 (emphasizing dynamic
approach) with Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 128 (emphasizing eclectic pragmatism).
149. See Eskridge, supra note 124, at 657-66.
150. See, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 863-76 (1989) (Justice Kennedy joins
unanimous Court in finding U.S. Magistrate presiding over jury selection improper because not
intended by Congress without consent of the parties); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment that sexual stereotyping may make out Title VII claim,
relying on legislative history, with intentionalist orientation); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989) (per Rehnquist, CJ., legislative history suggests Congress
did not intend jurisdiction in instant case under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); see also W.
ESKRIDGE & P. FRIcKEY, supra note 35, at 350 n.115 ("Chief Justice Rehnquist will sometimes
disregard text or legislative history (but not both) to reach results supported by current policy or
fairness") (citing cases).
151. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (employing both originalist and evolutive
approaches to find punitive damages recoverable under § 1983); see also W. ESKRIDGE AND P.
FRICKEY, supra note 35, at 350 n.114 ("Justice Brennan has sometimes even adopted a textualist
perspective-contra Weber-in cams where a clear text supports a result at odds with contextual
evidence and policy considerations.") (emphasis in original) (citing cases). Compare National Labor
Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 508-18 (1979) (Justice Brennan takes strong textualist
and originalist approaches) with United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 195 (Justice Brennan relies
heavily on evolutive and purposive approaches).
152. See, e.g., W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRuCKEY, supra note 35, at 329-30; Zweigert & Puttfarken,
Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style, 44 TUL L. REV. 704, 706 (1970).
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unrestrained judicial choice in assigning meaning to statutory terms. 3  The
approach closest to free inquiry is found where commentators argue for reading
statutes to emphasize fairness, equality, aid to the disempowered, or aid to the
politically favored.134 No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates
judicial application of statutes but the basic methodologies employed by courts
seem well-established if not always well-defined.
Interest Group Analysis. A rich body of literature has emerged discussing
the impact of interest group activity on lawmaking.155  A good deal of this
writing is written from the "public choice" perspective, in which the author applies
economic concepts such as individual utility maximization and presumed
rationality to predict that political actors, particularly legislators, will vote (or
avoid voting) in a manner designed to increase their job security, wealth, or
personal power and prestige rather than to reflect a particular ideology or policy
assessment." 6 Public choice theory largely proceeds by applying to legislative
behavior an economic model of rational behavior. The fulcrum of public choice
theory is the notion that interest groups compete for monopoly "rents" established
by the legislature 157 through lobbying, promising support, marshalling opposition
153. But see Sunstein, supra note 128, at 438-39 ("courts should be authorized to depart from the
ordinary or original meaning [of a statute] and to press ambiguous words in particular directions if the
context suggests this would lead to superior outcomes") (footnote omitted). Professor Sunstein found
some support for this view in the writings of Alexander Hamilton. Id. at 440 n.123 (quoting THE
FEDERAIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton)).
The free inquiry or "anti-doctrinal" approach has greater favor in Europe. See W. ESKRIDGE
& P. FRICKEY, supra note 35, at 329-30 (citing F. GENY, METHOD D'INTERPRETATION Er SOURCES
EN DROIT PRIVE POSrTiF (1899)). Although Professor Sunstein sees courts as having greater latitude
in this regard than traditionally assumed, a direct comparison between European and American courts
is perhaps inapt because of the substantial distinction between European legislatures, which are marked
by greater ideological orientation, partisanship, party discipline, and fluid mobility than their U.S.
counterparts.
154. This perspective is perhaps most often reflected in writings of Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
authors. See, e.g., Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology of
Judging, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1152 (1985); Singer, The Player & the Cards: Nihilism & Legal Theory, 94 YALE LJ. 1 (1984). For
criticisms of the CLS perspective, see Chow, Trashing Nihilism, 65 TuL L REV. 221 (1990).
155. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TuULoCM, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); R. DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF A PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1986); M. FiORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE
WASHINGTON ESTABUSHMENT (1977); M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF THE
POLMCAL MARKETS (1981); J. KINGDON, AGENDA, ALTERNATivES, AND PUBU1C POLICIES (1984); T.
Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION (1974); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTivE ACTION (1965); R. RIPLEY, CONGRESS:
PROCESS AND POuCY (1977); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNAY, ORGANIZED INTEREST AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1986).
156. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TUUKOCK, supra note 155; M. FIORINA, supra note 155; M.
HAYES, supra note 155; T. Low], supra note 155; D. MAYHEW, supra note 155; M. OLSON, supra note
155; R. RIPLEY, supra note 155.
157. Monopoly rents are enhanced earnings reaped by those who have managed to suppress
competition. Ricardian rents are enhanced earnings resulting from superior talent, such as the higher
appearance fees enjoyed by Frank Sinatra as compared to an ordinary singer. See A. ALCHIAN AND
W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION 189 (3d ed. 1983); see also J. GWARTNEY & R_ WAGNER,
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or corrupting legislators and that legislators respond to powerful interest groups
in order to stay in power.'-
Public choice and other writers focused on interest groups tend not only to
exhibit a wide range of views about what happens in the political process but also
diverge even more widely as to normative prescriptions. Some writers find the
market-based political arena acceptable while others decry it and seek structural
reform to mute the power of interest groups. Correspondingly, these scholars take
different views of the implications of interest group theory for statutory
construction. Although it does not inevitably support a particular interpretative
approach, interest group analysis can be used to illuminate the particular statute
in question so that the reviewing court can determine whether the provision is a
publicly purposed enactment, as assumed by Professors Hart & Sacks, or a
private-regarding deal, which should receive more narrow construction to prevent
interest groups from obtaining more from courts than they could from the legislature."
One might easily envision a continuum of both scholarly views and, more
important, specific statutes. Some laws, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act,160
PuBLIc CHOICE & CoNsTiTONAL EcoNoMics 22 (1988) ("Rent-seeking is a term used by
economists to describe actions taken by individuals and groups to alter public policy in order to gain
personal advantage at the expense of others").
Most reference in legal literature to "rents" has focused on monopoly rents, which are generally
condemned as resulting from market imperfections, often obtained by less than praiseworthy means.
By contrast, Ricardian rents are generally not subject to criticism, no matter how much one agrees with
the Doonesbury perspective on Sinatra or questions the taste of the consuming public (e.g., Guns 'N
Roses, New Kids on the Block). See, e.g., Macey, supra note 135, at 224 ("Rent-seeking refers to the
attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for the use of an economic asset in excess of the
market price through government intervention in the market.")).
158. See J. BucHANAN & G. TuLocK, supra note 155, at 283-96; J. GwARTNEY & IL WAGNER,
supra note 155, at 7-24; W. ESKIUDGE & P. FRICXEY, supra note 35, at 323-26; Eskridge, supra note
48, at 278-85; Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 883-90
(1987); Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 123, 126-28 (1989); Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern
Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 905, 945-48 (1990).
159. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court & the
Economic System, 98 HARv. L REV. 4, 15 (1984).
If statutes generally are designed to overcome 'failures' in markets and to replace the
calamities produced by unguided private conduct with the ordered rationality of the public
sector, then it makes sense to use the remedial [broad, liberal construction] approach to
the construction of statutes--or at least most of them. It, on the other hand, statutes often
are designed to replace the outcomes of private transactions with monopolistic ones, to
transfer the profits ("rents") of productive activity to a privileged few, then judges should
take the beady-eyed contractual [narrow, strict construction] approach.
Id.
This approach can be seen as inconsistent with the more textually driven literal approach to
interpretation seemingly urged by Judge Easterbrook in his article, Statutes' Domains. Easterbrook,
Statutes'Domains, 50 U. On. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); see W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note
35, at 612-13.
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-(d).
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are at the public interest end of the continuum" 1 while others, such as the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff,16 are at the private deal end of the spectrum. 163
Depending upon where a reviewing court consciously or subconsciously places a
law under review, the court may apply a differing approach according to the
degree to which it wishes to expansively interpret or buttress a "good" law or limit
the damage of a "bad" law.
B. Applying Statutory Interpretation Theory to the
Employment Contract Exception
Reviewing the employment exception of Section 1 of the Arbitration Act
according to the different interpretative constructs suggests that limiting the
exception to workers engaged in interstate transit lacks substantial support under
any major interpretative school. Several schools strongly contradict these judicial
interpretations.
Textualism. The textualist view provides perhaps the best support for a
narrow view of the types of workers entitled to the employment exception to
arbitrability but is insufficiently persuasive, especially when other factors are
considered. Section 1 speaks of "any other class of workers engaged in interstate
commerce." 1 4  As some courts rendering the narrow interpretation have
suggested, the term "engaged in commerce" differs from "affecting commerce",
the broader language used by Congress when it legislates at the height of its
powers under the Commerce Clause. Although there is obviously a semantic
distinction between the words and a possibly different connotation, this seems a
thin sliver of evidence on which to base a statutory construction that potentially
affects millions of workers.
To some extent, this shortcoming is inherent in virtually any exclusively
textualist statutory construction in that it presumes that Congress (indeed, different
Congresses) carefully and exactly choose precise words intended to differentiate
statutes passed decades apart. Thus, the textualist giving narrow scope to the
employment exception presumes that the 1925 Congress enacting the Arbitration
Act consciously wrote "engaged in commerce" with the goal of differentiating the
Act from previous statutes using "affecting commerce" and that post-1925
161. Although various groups were, of course, organized and supporting the 1964 Act, the law
provided a diffuse benefit across society rather than a concentrated benefit to a few. In addition, the
forces supporting the Act were not relatively discreet interests with much to gain from the law. See
W. ESKIUDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 35, at 1-28.
162. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
163. Smoot-Hawley is private-regarding because its passage resulted from the directed activities
of a relatively small group (American manufacturers facing foreign competition) who stood to gain
much from passage of the higher tariff while the diffuse public stood to lose only a small amount as
individual consumers but a large amount as a society. See W. ESKIKDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note
35, at 40-46.
164. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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Congresses used the term "affecting commerce" to provide broader coverage than
that given workers by the Section 1 employment exception.
This view assumes an unrealistic degree of drafting precision, awareness of
the terminology of other statutes, and efforts to provide continuity between
legislatures.1' Unfortunately, the current Supreme Court's fascination with
"plain meaning" and willingness to find it in even relatively open-ended text can
be read as supporting the semantic distinction between "affecting commerce" and
"engaged in commerce." Recall that in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Co.," the Supreme Court found plain meaning in the term "contract of
employment" and implicitly differentiated these from a "contract affecting
employment," thus replicating the suspect approach to Section I seen in the
Tenney case." 7
The narrow construction of the employment exception and its thin textualist
support also lacks persuasiveness because the relatively small number of cases
construing it have yielded results exposing the unhelpfulness of the distinction.
For example, the cases involving postal workers have quickly concluded that these
workers as a class are engaged in commerce'" notwithstanding that many of
them never leave the confines of their own localities; to call letter delivery
"commerce" invokes a proper but broad notion of the word.
Conversely, the cases involving stockbrokers have been equally quick to
conclude that these workers,'" although they clearly affect interstate commerce,
as a class are not engaged in interstate commerce. In other words, the broker who
uses a long distance phone and the mail to consummate the sale of $100,000 of
federally regulated securities from a California buyer to a New York seller is not
engaged in interstate commerce because she does not engage in physical
movement of items across state lines. However, the letter carrier who lives in
Lincoln, Nebraska, picks up mail at the central post office there, and then delivers
it in a residential area of Lincoln is a worker engaged in interstate commerce.
When word fixation renders results that contradict common sense, this should
signal courts that the textual approach is either inapt, has been applied in too
crabbed a manner, or both.' 70 The incoherence of the "engaged in com-
165. See supra notes 102-08, 139-44 and accompanying text,(discussing shortcomings of model
that assumes well-informed, rational, public-spirited legislative behavior at all times); see also J.
BARRY, THE AMBrON AND THE POWER (1988) (author-observer at elbow of former House Speaker
Jim Wright continually notes harried atmosphere in which legislation is enacted, precluding time for
careful drafting and choice of precise words intended to differentiate statutes); Sterk, The Continuity
of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 647, 658-68 (1988)
(noting lack of coordinated policy choice or statutory integration between successive legislatures).
166. 111 S. Ct. at 1651-52 n.2; see supra notes 85-122 and accompanying text.
167. See Tenney, 207 F.2d 450; supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing American Postal Workers and
Bacashihua).
169. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing these cases, including Dickstein).
170. See Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 12 S. Ct. 511, 516 (1892) (statutory
language should not be applied literally where this yields absurd results or results inconsistent with
congressional purpose); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
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merce/affecting commerce" semantic distinction as applied suggests that courts
must look beyond textualism to reach apt construction of Section 1.
Intentionalism. A number of the cases giving only a narrow scope to the
phrase "workers engaged in commerce" have purported to support the narrow
construction by reference to the legislative history of the Arbitration Act.171 In
particular, these courts note that the employment exception was included in the bill
at the behest of the Sailors Union, which feared its members would lose some of
the protections available to them under federal statutory law if disputes were
arbitrated rather than litigated. 72
The American Bar Association committee drafting the bill responded by
specifically exempting sailors, railroad workers (who enjoyed similar special
federal statutory protections) 73 and the now problematic "any other class of
workers engaged in commerce" language. 74 From this slender piece of
legislative history, the majority of courts have concluded Congress intended the
employment exception to apply only to workers similar to sailors and railroad
workers, Le., those who physically move things across state lines and enjoy federal
statutory favor, adopting a narrow view of similarity.
Prior to the ABA's change in the language to the proposed bill that ultimately
became the Act, there had been discussion of the issue in Congress on the
predecessor bill to the Act. Although the 67th Congress did not pass the Act, it
held hearings on arbitration legislation virtually identical to the legislation that was
enacted during the 68th Congress. Although this dialogue is perhaps not part of
the core legislative history of the Act, it is instructive, certainly more probative
than the vague speculations of the Tenney and Signal-Stat courts and the textual
rigidity of the Gilmer Court. Kansas City attorney- W.H.H. Piatt, testifying on
behalf of the ABA, had the following exchange with Senator Sterling, who had
authored the legislation.
Mr. PIATT. [T]here is another matter I should call to your
attention. Since you introduced this bill there has been an objection
raised against it that I think should be met here, to wit, the official
171. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing narrow construction in cases such
as Tenney).
172. According to H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923), the Arbitration Act was
essentially drafted by the American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial
Law. That report states:
Objections to the bill were urged by Mr. Andrew Furuseth as representing the Seamen's
Union, Mr. Furuseth taking the position that seamen's wages came within admiralty
jurisdiction and should not be subject to an agreement to arbitrate. In order to eliminate
this opposition, the committee consented to an amendment to Section I as follows: 'but
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.'
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 48 A.B.A. Rep. 287 (1923).
173. See Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1988).
174. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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head, or whatever he is, of that part of the labor union that has to do
with the ocean-the seamen-
Senator STERLING. Mr. [Andrew] Furuseth?
Mr. PLAIT. Yes, some such name as that. He has objected to it,
and criticized it on the ground that the bill in its present form would
affect, in fact compel, arbitration of the matters of agreement between
the stevedores and their employers. Now, it was not the intention of the
bill to have any such effect as that. It was not the intention of this bill
to make an industrial arbitration in any sense; and so I suggest that in
as far as the committee is concerned, if your honorable committee
should feel that there is any danger of that, they should add to the bill
the following language 'but nothing herein contained shall apply to
seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce.'
It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes at
all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege
of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages
are, if they want to do it. Now, that is all there is in this.
175
Despite attorney Piatt's thinly veiled dislike for organized labor and the
almost offhand nature of his suggested redrafting of the bill, his opinion appears
to represent the consensus of the Act's promoters, affected interest groups, and
Congress in general: the Act was to abrogate the common law rule against
specific performance of arbitration agreements so that merchants could enforce
arbitration agreements; the Act was not to apply to any employment contracts.
The most logical inference is that Piatt (and the ABA Committee of Commerce,
Trade, and Commercial Law which Piatt chaired and which submitted the bill that
became the Act during the ensuing Congress) spoke only of workers "engaged in
commerce" out of a belief that the Act, which was based upon congressional
power to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause, would automatically have no
impact on workers who were not engaged in interstate commerce.
Discussion of legislator views of Section 1 is necessarily speculative because
of the virtual dearth of comment on the provision. Consequently, reviewing courts
should approach any intentionalist view of Section 1 with caution. Despite this,
courts such as Tenney and Signal-Stat, which adopted a narrow construction, have
spoken as though some sort of clear legislative intent supported their reliance on
the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, which has been invoked to
conclude that the catchall provision of the employment exception must apply only
175. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearings on S. 4213 & S. 4214 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong.,
4th Sess. 9 (1922) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Hearings] (Testimony of W.H.H. Piatt).
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to workers who belong to a group that actively performs interstate movement of
products.
176
Another weak argument supporting the narrow construction of the exception's
catchall provision is the special status of sailors and railroad workers. Some
courts have tended to focus on the dispute resolution mechanisms already
governing labor-management relations'" and to construe Section 1 as applying
only to workers already covered by a statutory arbitration scheme. A variant of
this view argues that the Section 1 exception applies only to "privileged"
workers t and thus should be so restricted via the ejusdem generis mode of
construction in which only workers for which there is some demonstrated federal
favoritism may avail themselves of the Section 1 employment exception. In view
of the limited data in the legislative record, neither view merits intentionalist
support. As a dissenting judge in a key narrow construction case observed, "[t]he
legislative history [of Section 1] is of a kind that possesses little weight and should
not be considered."
1 79
As a matter of logic and publicly interested statutory construction, this
interest group compass for divining legislative intent has even less to recommend
it. In effect, a court taking this view advocates a statutory interpretation which
heightens interest group gains by denying the benefits of the employment contract
176. See, e.g., Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452.
[U]nder the rule of ejusdem generis [the catchall language in the Section 1 exception was
intended] to include only those other classes of workers who are likewise engaged directly
in commerce, that is, only those other classes of workers who are actually engaged in the
movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to
be in practical effect part of it.
Id.
177. See, e.g., id. at 452-53 ("[t]he draftsmen had in mind the two groups of transportation
workers as to which special arbitration legislation already existed and they rounded out the
exclusionary clause by excluding all other similar classes of workers'). Unfortunately, Tenney and
other courts giving narrow construction to the employment exception fall to mention any other statutes
establishing arbitration regimes. Unless courts like Tenney viewed Congress as anticipating more laws
like the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-57 (1988), which establishes a labor arbitration scheme,
they were rendering the catchall a nullity and violating the canon of construction that requires courts
to give effect to all statutory language, a canon of at least arguable importance equivalent to the
ejusdem generis canon. Perhaps more important, the Tenney court's notion of what the Act's
supporters *had in mind* is belied by what little evidence of legislative intent exists.
178. For example, the FELA provides injured workers with a claim for relief that may be brought
in either state or federal court without removal from state court (total forum choice by plaintiff) as well
as a rule of pure comparative negligence in which an injured worker can recover some compensation
for injuries even where the worker's negligence greatly exceeds that of the employer. See 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1988). Sailors have similarly broad remedial rights, both procedural and substantive, that
exceed those of conventional tort law in most states. See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). In the early
Twentieth Century these laws were considered fair or necessary to offset historical dangers and
mistreatment befalling these workers. Criticism of both acts has increased, however. Recently, the
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended repeat of both statutes since they single out particular
types of workers for benefits not shared by the workforce at large. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT 62-64 (1990).
179. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 454, 455 (Biggs, CJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
HeinOnline -- 1991 J. Disp. Resol. 292 1991
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT EXCLUSION
exception to all other workers simply because they were not on the scene when
Sailors Union President Furuseth complained and ABA committee chair Piatt
thought of the first set of words that came to mind when adapting the Act to the
concerns of the Sailors Union. Although the legislative background shows sailors
effectively and easily lobbying for the exemption and railway workers quickly
added, this hardly compels the conclusion that only sailors were to reap its
benefits.' so
Although one can draw analogies between seamen and other workers, these
analogies lack the persuasiveness of a specific statutory text or a clear congressio-
nal pronouncement in the legislative history. Furthermore, the analogy supporting
narrow construction is vulnerable to attack. One could as easily argue that the
ABA committee and Congress, in so rapidly adopting the provision urged by the
sailors, were sensitive to the vulnerable position of employees and desired to
protect them from losing any legal rights through sharp contracting practices that
employers might use. Taking this view, the existence of the catchall makes more
sense.
Another concern about the narrow interpretation that was never addressed by
the courts adopting it: if one assumes that Congress only wished the employment
exception to apply to privileged workers or to workers with arbitration schemes
already established by statute, the listing of seamen and railroad workers
effectively exhausted the universe. The catchall, if it is to have meaning, either
was inserted to respond to future labor law, to protect workers subject to contract
pressures by employers, or both.
In addition, the case law of the employment exception undercuts the
intentionalist rationale of the narrow view. Postal workers, although subject to
labor laws regulating collective bargaining by public employees, also enjoy civil
service protection and generally better wages and job security than many workers.
Although they are unlikely to be oppressed by individual contracts of employment
with arbitration clauses, they are seen as within the narrow scope of Section 1
while other workers who are more likely to be subject to arbitration clauses of
questionable consent are not protected by Section 1. In addition, vast numbers of
postal workers are not directly engaged in the movement of goods across state
lines, a factor thought important by courts applying the narrow view of the
employment exception.1 ' Further, the narrow reading of the employment
exception may make it superfluous. If the most common thread among workers
entitled to the exception is not their employment activity but rather the presence
180. Although it has been deemed legitimate to examine the contribution of non-official sources
to statutes, even those taking a broad view of permissible considerations agree that non-legislative
material should be accorded less weight in discerning congressional intent. See, e.g., Kosak v. United
States, 465 U.S. 848, 857 n. 13 (1984) (Court employs memorandum by nonmember of Congress
regarding unsuccessful predecessor to Federal Tort Claims Act to interpret FrCA exception but
acknowledging that "ideas expressed [by nonlegislators] should not be given great weight in
determining the intent of the legislature').
181. See, e.g., Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452; see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
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of a federally established labor arbitration scheme, that scheme would logically
pre-empt any arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts.""
An additional factor to consider is the state of the common law of arbitration
at the time of the Act's passage. As previously noted, 1s 3 courts prior to 1925
usually failed to give specific performance to predispute arbitration agreements.
By definition, courts generally did not enforce arbitration agreements contained in
employment contracts. 18 In attempting to divine legislative intent, a court could
rationally conclude that Congress did not intend to change any of the common law
of arbitration except where this was clear from the face of the statute or the
legislative materials. Under these circumstances, where Congress wrote into the
Act an employment contract exception that is at least ambiguous, courts should be
hesitant to conclude that the catchall provision of the employment contract
exclusion was intended to abrogate the common law prerogatives of contractual
employees.
Proponents and opponents of narrow construction can debate these points
endlessly. However, it is beyond debate that the legislative background of Section
1 simply does not speak with sufficient clarity to make an intentionalist position
the last word on the issue. For supporters of the narrow interpretation, intentional-
ism presents a weak case at best. However, one can take this same legislative
history, perhaps with an "imaginative reconstruction" of intentionalism, and present
a strong case for a broad view of Section 1. Under this method a court should,
upon finding that the enacting Congress did not give specific consideration to the
application of the statute to the instant case, imaginatively reconstruct what it
believes Congress would have done had it knowingly faced the question.185
Without doubt, Congress did not when passing Section 1 stop to consider
whether stockbrokers, assembly line workers, salespersons, or professional athletes
were within the employment exception. The evidence suggests, however, that the
1925 Congress would have considered all workers subject to the commerce power
as within the employment exception. The legislative history of the Act focuses
on commercial dealings and the perceived problem of courts failing to enforce
arbitration provisions in commercial contracts.s' The Act was clearly the pet
project of the nation's business community, which focused on arbitration between
182. See STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 8, at 313-21 (discussing federal statutory pre-emption).
The usual rule of statutory construction posits that a specific law (ie., the Railway Labor Act
provisions on arbitration) takes precedence over a general law (i.e., the Arbitration Act's command that
courts enforce private arbitration agreements). See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S.
557, 563 (1987) (Railroad Workers FELA claim not required to be arbitrated under RLA).
183. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
184. See Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 406-07.
185. See R. POSNER, supra note 126, at 286-87.
186. See generally Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and HA 646 Before the House and Senate
Judiciary Comms., 68th Congs., 1st Sess. (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (discussion focuses
exclusively on both the problem of inadequate judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements between
commercial traders and notes emerging popularity of commercial arbitration and commercial arbitration
organizations).
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commercial firms, not between employer and employee."s' This suggests that
the 1925 Congress, if put the question directly, would have preferred that the text
of its Section 1 employment exception to be interpreted broadly. Many members
of Congress must have viewed the Act as directed exclusively toward intra-
merchant contracts. Others undoubtedly would have appreciated the weak
bargaining power of employees asked to sign a contract containing an arbitration
provision.'" Still others saw the Act as a means of thinning court dockets.'
Because employment-related litigation comprised only a fraction of cases during
the 1920s, legislators viewing the Act as a form of docket relief would have been
unlikely to argue against a broad construction of the employment exception.
Purposivism. The purposivist approach argues for a broad construction of the
types of workers exempted from the Act. The purpose of the Act was to foster
enforcement of arbitration agreements so that commercial entitities could reap
perceived benefits of expert decisionmakers, lowered disputing costs, and increased
187. See, e.g., i at 21-24 (listing 67 business organizations supporting proposed Act, including
letters of endorsements from various groups).
188. One must not make too much of this, however. In 1925, employees had far fewer statutory
rights and wrongful discharge doctrine was virtually nonexistent. But see Senate Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 175, at 9-10 (Questions of Sen. Walsh during testimony of W. H. H. Piatt, representing the
ABA). Their exchange, albeit brief, suggests not only a consensus that the employment contract
exception was intended to protect workers in general because of their minimal bargaining power with
employers but also a generalized agreement that arbitration agreements should only be enforced if
sufficiently voluntary.
Senator WALSH of Montana. The trouble about the matter is that a great many
of these contracts that are entered into are really not voluntarily things as all. Take an
insurance policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or you can leave it...
Mr. PIATr. [I]t is not the intention of this bill to cover insurance cases ...
Speaking for myself, personally, I would say I would not favor any kind of legislation that
would permit the forcing a man to sign that kind of contract [of adhesion in a bill of
lading where refusal to sign imperils goods]. I can see where that could be, right now.
Senator WALSH of Montana. You can see where they are not really voluntary
contracts, in a strict sense.
Mr. PIATr. I think that ought to be protested against, because it is the primary end
of this contract that it is a contract between merchants with one with another, buying and
selling goods. The shipper is nearly always under a necessity.
Senator WALSH of Montana. Yes.
Mr. PIATT. It is like we go and buy a railroad ticket. We transport our own
baggage. We do not have anything to say about it.
Senator WALSH of Montana. Of course it is well established that the railroad company
can not insist upon these restrictions and conditions that they put in their contract...
Mr. JAMES. There is nothing that I can add to anything you have said. The
subject has been fully covered.
Id.
Concern about adequate consent to an arbitration clause suggests a broader interpretation of the
Section 1 exception in light of the typically involuntary employee assent to contract provisions. See
Stempel, supra note 13, at 1395.
189. Accord Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 175, at 3.4 (Statement of Charles L.
Bernheimer); see Joint Hearings, supra note 186, at 16-18 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (nation
in midst of litigation backlog making private dispute resolution desirable to lessen court congestion).
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certainty and acceptability of outcomes.'o The "mischief" was judicial jealously
ofjurisdiction, which resulted in giving arbitration clauses less favorable treatment
than ordinary contracts.""1 The "remedy" for the mischief was a statutory
directive that arbitration contracts be given treatment equal to that accorded to
other types of contracts.' 92
Accepting this as the thrust of the Act, one need not a great deal of
imagination to realize that the purpose of the Act was to clear up a perceived
problem involving commercial arbitration. Consequently, courts interpreting the
Act should broadly construe both the Act's coverage and power regarding
commercial arbitration but read the Act more narrowly when it is applied to
noncommercial situations. Since Congress in fact added the Section 1 text
exempting employment contract arbitration clauses, one would expect a true
purposivist to read the employment exception broadly, or at least to refrain from
narrow construction absent a clear congressional directive.
Dynamism. The evolutionary approach to statutory construction demonstrably
favors a broader view of employment contracts falling within the Section 1
exception. Since 1925, legislatures, courts, and the public have all become
substantially more solicitous of employee rights. Various labor' 93 and antidiscrim-
ination' 94 laws have been enacted and enforced by the courts, which have
increasingly been receptive to common law wrongful discharge actions.' 95 In
addition, the legal community since 1925 has shown a far more sensitive
appreciation of the problems attending contracts between parties of vastly unequal
bargaining power where contract terms are essentially dictated by the party with
more leverage1 96 Modem courts have shown greater willingness to police such
190. See Joint Hearings, supra note 186, at 35.
191. See Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great
Britain and the United States, 25 UmV. Cm. L. REV. 445, 452 (1958); Wolaver, supra note 2, at 138-
44.
192. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 6.
193. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 102-219 (1988).
194. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988); Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (important amendments to bar pregnancy discrimination);
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 421 U.S.C. §§ 6101-07 (1988).
195. See Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Wil Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown
of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L REV. 323, 377 (1986).
196. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 464, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971)
(refusing to enforce limitation of remedies clause in gasoline dealer's franchise agreement); E.
FARNSWORTh, CONTRAC7S §§ 4.26-.28 (1982) (discussing contracts of adhesion and unconscionable
contracts, citing increasing number of cases since 1925 that have employed these concepts to aid
disadvantaged party); Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis: An
Introduction, 5 AIKRON L REv. 1, 30 (1972); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts of
Freedom of Contracts, 43 Coum. L. REv. 629, 633 (1943); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-
The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 504 (1967).
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agreements for substantive fairness. 9 7 In short, the legal world--both judicial
and legislative-is today more hesitant to mandate enforcement of adhesive
bargains between unequals unless the terms are basically fair, yield economically
efficient results, and do not run afoul of other legal goals.1" Recently, Congress
voted to expand and fortify antidiscrimination protections for individual workers
but the legislation was successfully vetoed by President Bush.1"
In this environment, it is unlikely that Congress, if asked to interpret Section
1 or to write it from scratch would take the narrow view of "workers engaged in
commerce" that has dominated since the 1950s. Rather, today's legislators would
most likely exempt all workers from the Arbitration Act because of the inherently
disempowered position of the individual employee, who can easily be led to sign
a contract providing not only for arbitration, but also for arbitration stacked in
favor of the employer. In addition, many members of Congress would probably
agree with the courts, which have usually found arbitration forums too inhospitable
to federal antidiscrimination laws (although the Supreme Court has not).2s The
Supreme Court has read Congress, through passage of Title VII, to have implicitly
put race and gender employment discrimination claims outside the reach of
197. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 403, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (refusing to give
effect to provisions characterized as unconscionable contained in contract of adhesion); see also sources
cited supra note 196.
198. See E. FARNSWORTh, supra note 196; Linzer, Uncontracts, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 137,
166-81. Furthermore, considerable flux and uncertainty has attended the legal characterization of
exactly who is a "seaman," a Section 1 term viewed as key by Tenney, Signal-Stat and other courts
applying a narrow construction of the employment contract exception. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v.
Wilander, 111 S. Q. 807, 811 (1991). Wilander clarified the issue by stating that one need not be
actively engaged in activities in aid of the navigation of a vessel to be a seaman. Rather, the
unanimous Wilander Court dpfmd 'seaman' (and consequently the term 'master or member of a crew'
under the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988)) 'solely
in terms of the employee's connection to a vessel in navigation,[finding that the] key to seaman status
is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation" rather than actual navigation activity by
the employee. 111 S. Ct. at 817.
Wilander thus adopted a pragmatic and functional approach to the issue of seaman status,
suggesting that the modem judicial view should apply a similar approach to the Section 1 exception.
Confining the employment contract exception solely to workers engaged in physical movement of
goods across state lines is decidedly formal (it attaches too much importance to the words "engaged
in" and the ejusdem generis canon) and dysfunctional. The function of Section 1 was to prevent
oppression of individual employees. A broad construction of Section 1 vindicates that function while
a narrow construction thwarts it.
199. See Stempel, The Rehnquist Cour, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens and a
Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 653 (1991).
200. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,49 (1974) (holding that arbitration clause
in collective bargaining agreement does not encompass Title VII disputes as arbitration forum would
give insufficient support to statute's goals); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292
(1984) (finding union's arbitration clause not to encompass individual employee's constitutional claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding
individual employee's ADEA claims not subject to arbitration clause in his employment contract),
overruled by Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1655-57.
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predispute arbitration agreements.201 Regardless of whether these interpretations
are correct," 2 they indicate a legal, politicalm and social environment that
harbors some significant misgivings about vigorously enforcing arbitration clauses
against individual workers. This context supports a broader interpretation of the
employment exception of Section 1.
One could argue that the increasing favor shown arbitration by the courts
during the 1970s and 1980s represents an evolutionary trend so favorable to
arbitration that a narrow construction of the employment exception is necessary
to remain consistent with that evolution. I disagree. As noted above, the Court
has declined to permit arbitrability in a number of cases in which employees were
thought to be disadvantaged by arbitration and perhaps had not really consented
to arbitrate. Despite its endorsement of arbitration and removal of public policy
exceptions for securities, antitrust, ERISA and ADEA claims, the Supreme Court
has consistently stated that arbitration is an obligation created by contract and that
a party can be required to arbitrate only if it has made a sufficiently clear
agreement to arbitrate' 4 and has required that courts make this determina-
tion.2 The generalized increase in court regard for arbitration is not inconsis-
tent with and does not overcome the trend toward concern over employee rights
and limited choice in contracting. In addition, the demise of the "indirect/direct"
distinction in constitutional Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests that the
"engaged in commerce/affecting commerce" distinction, giving some textualist
support to a narrow reading of Section 1, has even less persuasive power than it
once did.2'
201. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48. However, the Court recently claimed that Alexander was
premised more on grounds of preclusion and the potential conflict of interest between union members
and the union. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1656-57. Although Alexander can be explained as a
collective bargaining exception to arbitrability based on what I call a "defective agency" defense (see
Stempel, supra note 13, at 587), most observers have interpreted Alexander as based on public policy
concerns or a purported statutory conflict between Title VII and the Act. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note
2, at 585; Sterk, supra note 9, at 507.
202. In Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Public Policy Exception to Arbitrabiity, I argue that cases
such as Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and McDonald v. City of West Branch (allowing 42 U.S.C. §
1983 litigation of disputed facts previously decided in labor arbitration) misinterpreted the statutes in
question. Stempel, supra note 2, at 585.
203. Cases such as Alexander, McDonald, and Nicholson, creating a civil rights exception to
arbitrability and another case creating an individual employee's exception to arbitrability of Fair Labor
Standards Act claims, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Motor Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), have not
been subject to any serious legislative effort to change their results. Although lack of congressional
response may result from a variety of factors, absence of even attempted change in the law, especially
when organized commercial and union actors would presumably prefer the arbitral forum, suggests to
me that the results of the cases exempting many employee claims from abitration comport with current
views. See generally Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MItci. L. REV. 67, 89 (1988).
204. See, e.g., Neil, 918 F.2d at 37.
205. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986).
206. See STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 8, at 115-210 (discussing Supreme Court's ultimate
rejection of test of congressional regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause based on whether
activity regulated had "direct" affect on interstate commerce).
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Eclectic Pragmatism. Regarding the employment exception, the eclectic
pragmatist would probably minimize the influence of the textualist and intentional-
ist schools since both are ambiguous regarding what Section 1 meant by "workers
engaged in commerce."2 7 However, making use of other methods with potential
value, eclectic pragmatism would most likely favor a broader reading of the
exception. The 1925 Congress was concerned with enforcing agreements among
business firms, not encouraging employers to establish an arbitration system for
private employment disputes.2 The legislative purpose of the Act similarly
would not support a narrow reading, because lack of enforcement of employment
arbitration clauses was not the perceived mischief toward which the Act was
directed.2
Other Considerations If employing a free inquiry approach and left only to
find the "best" view of Section 1, a court would presumably elect a broad
construction of the employment exception. This approach furthers the goal of the
Act in ensuring that arbitration agreements be placed on equal footing with other
contracts and permitting parties to consensually move disputes, principally
commercial disputes, from the courts to arbitrators. The broader reading of the
employment exception prevents the Act from making arbitration contracts more
equal than others and also protects a relatively weak party, the individual
employee, from being bound by clauses in contracts whose consensual nature is
highly suspect. Free inquiry should not lead to statutory construction that results
in the enforcement of contracts whose consensual underpinnings are suspect.210
This broader reading would tend to give individual workers the protections
enjoyed by union members, who are often subject to arbitration of their work
disputes. Although the union member is bound by such arbitration clauses, she
is bound not because she was coerced but because an arbitration agreement was
included in the collective bargaining agreement resulting from the negotiations of
her powerful agent (the union). In the event of dispute with the employer, she is
represented by the union against the employer. Although there exists considerable
potential for conflict of interest, the unionized worker at least has some backing
in attempting to negotiate contract terms with the more powerful party. Individual
employees, unless possessed with attributes in high demand (e.g., movie actors,
former presidents, both), lack this negotiating leverage.
Under the current regime, as acknowledged in the Supreme Court's recent
Gilmer opinion, union members are treated much more favorably under the
Arbitration Act.211 When unionized workers arbitrate pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement and suffer an adverse result, they may nonetheless obtain
207. 9 U.S.C. § 1. However, the intentionalist perspective is less ambiguous and tends to support
the broader construction exempting all employment contracts from the Act. See supra notes 128-30
and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
209. See id
210. See Stempel, supra note 13, at 587.
211. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1656-57.
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trial de novo on claims brought pursuant to Title VII,2 12 the Fair Labor
Standards Act,213 and the Civil Rights Acts.2 4  By contrast, the individual
worker, whose consent to arbitration is more suspect, has no ability to relitigate
adverse arbitration results touching on discrimination claims. 213 This suggests
an interest group perspective in favor of the broader construction of Section 1. A
broader version of the employment contract exception would tend to place
relatively weak unorganized workers on the same footing as unionized workers,
who through their unions have more political clout.
By contrast, the narrow view of the employment exception is better only if
one uncritically accepts the view that arbitration provides superior resolution of
employment related claims. To date, there is no evidence of such superiority.
Certainly, the Supreme Court has found to the contrary, 216 and employees
involved in disputes with their employers seem, if the reported cases are even
roughly indicative, to prefer the judicial forum. Because the consent of the
average employee to arbitration is highly suspect, 27 a court advocating narrow
construction to further overall policies of contract enforcement and free choice is
unlikely to be persuasive.
An interest group/public choice analysis of the Arbitration Act suggests that
it falls somewhere between the public interest end of the continuum (e.g., the 1964
Civil Rights Act) and its rent-seeking opposite (e.g., the Smoot-Hawley Tariff).
To be sure, the Act was passed as the result of group activity to help the active
group. However, the interest group involved (the merchant community) was rather
large. In classic rent-seeking legislation, the victorious interest group is small and
receives a tangible wealth transfer because of the legislation. Although American
merchants were undoubtedly happy to see the Act passed, one is hard pressed to
see how the wealth of others in society was in any way transferred to merchants
merely because merchants could now more easily obtain judicial enforcement of
intra-merchant arbitration agreements. At best, there was a very attenuated gain
in that merchants had statutory authorization for assistance from the judiciary that
212. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
213. See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745.
214. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292. McDonald involved a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
but its reasoning is applicable to any claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88.
215. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1556-58.
216. See, e.g.,Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53-54; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 74345; McDonald, 466 U.S.
at 290-91. But see Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1654 ('generalized attacks on arbitration [based) 'on suspicion
of arbitration . . . are 'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes '") (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)).
217. Nonlawyer employees will generally appreciate neither the types of job disputes that may
arise nor the differences between arbitration and litigation. When they do, they will often undervalue
the risk of a dispute arising during their job tenure. Accord, Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice
and the Framing of Decisions in RATIONAL CHOICE THE CONTRAST BMWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY 67 (R. Hogarth and M. Reder eds. 1987); see Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. OI. L. REv. 1129 (1986) (suggesting that people are often "myopic" and
undervalue short-term risks and benefits).
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others might have wished for their own personal legal problems. Similarly,
although the Act's authorization of injunctive relief may require other litigants to
wait until completion of emergency arbitration-related motions, there is no
significant loss to other litigants."'
Overall, the Act provides limited gains to a reasonably diffuse group
(merchants) with no costs or insignificant costs to a more diffuse group (non-
merchants). In addition, the Act is vested with at least some public regarding
aspects in that it presumably relieves overall court congestion to the benefit of the
litigating (but not arbitrating) public. To the extent that arbitration results are
more expert or tailored to commercial custom, this should foster greater
commercial harmony and economic efficiency, providing a diffuse benefit to
consumers.
During the subsequent 65 years, as the Act has been employed to enforce
boilerplate arbitration clauses in securities customer agreements, employment
agreements, and perhaps some merchant-consumer sales, one can argue that the
Act has conveyed a concentrated benefit (e.g., brokers can minimize or avoid legal
liability by directing disputes to an anti-employee or anti-customer forum) 2 9 and
imposed costs on consumers, who will either have less vindication of legal claims
or be discouraged from bringing claims at all. The issue of whether some arbitral
forums are kangaroo courts is both complex and beyond the scope of this article.
I suggest only that the Act as passed was not rent-seeking legislation and avoids
being a rent-seeking law so long as its application is confined to those situations
specifically envisioned by the 1925 Congress that passed the Act: organized
firms, particularly manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers.
When the Act is applied to others such as individual workers or securities
customers, the Act may well be transformed to a vehicle conveying wealth to
some by taking it from others. To the extent that courts resist this, they give the
Act a more public regarding construction. However, so long as a court operates
within the prevailing model of legislative supremacy and reasonable fidelity to
text, a court may need to apply the Act in situations that give it a rent-seeking
character. Securities customer accounts may be an example in that Section 2 of
the Act makes it applicable to "any contract" and neither Section 1 nor any other
part of the Act provides an exception for securities investors. However, the Act
does contain an exception for employees.
If interpretation of the scope of the exception is not mandated by text or clear
legislative background material, interest group/public choice theory suggests that
courts give the employment contract exception a broad reading. Interest group
analysis "liberals" would urge this to prevent the Act from becoming less public
218. Indeed, there may even be an overall gain to other litigants if disputes are removed from
litigation, thinning court congestion and speeding resolution of court disputes.
219. See Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 3, at 1, col.
2 (many customers, counsel representing claimants, and outside observers see securities industry
arbitration as favoring brokerage houses more than would courts); Henriques, When Naivete' Meets
Wal Street, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2. But cf. Siconolfi, Brokerage Firms Urged to
Speed Arbitration Awards to Investors, Wall St. J., July 26, 1990, at C1, col. 3.
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regarding. Hard core public choice libertarians, even those advocating court
enforcement of the legislative deal, should also opt for broad construction because
a narrow construction of the exception gives employers a rent-seeking legislative
victory that they did not truly win with the 1925 Congress.Y0 The original
congressional "deal" or "contract" was with merchants for merchants in their
dealings with each other. Unless required by text or similarly compelling matter,
courts should not sweeten the deal.
IV. THE ADAVANTAGES OF THE NEW CONSTRUCTION OF
SECTION 1
The potential gains from a broader interpretation of the workers covered by
the employment contract exclusion are significant. The parties affected by
employment contract arbitration clauses exhibit polarized views. Employers like
committing disputes with employees to arbitration. That is, of course, why
employers, who have virtually absolute control of the contract terms, include
arbitration provisions in some contracts.221 When a dispute arises, the reported
cases show employers seeking vigorous application of the arbitration agreement.
By contrast, these same cases find that employees seek to avoid arbitration
whenever possible through whatever argument is available.
Because of the inconsistent decisions surrounding the Act, employee efforts
to avoid the perceived disadvantages of the arbitral forum (which lacks Article III
judges, juries, evidence rules, broad discovery and appellate review) have run the
gamut of possibilities, some successful and some not. As previously noted,
attempting to invoke Section I to bring employment contract arbitration clauses
within the Act has largely failed since the 1950's except for the specifically
enumerated sailors and railroad workers as well as postal workers.2 Arguments
based on fraud, lack of consent, adhesive contract terms or unequal bargaining
power have also largely failed.m Surprisingly, the best success for employees
seeking to avoid arbitration has come not through contract-based contentions but
from public policy-based arguments, which have succeeded for employees making
claims pursuant to Title VII,22 The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),m the
220. See Macey, supra note 135, at 239.
221. Or, as the Gilmer opinion suggests, employers may now leverage employees into arbitration
agreements through surrogates and avoid Section 1 completely. See 111 S. Ct. at 1651-52 n.2 (New
York Stock Exchange registration application, which requires consent to employment dispute arbitration
in order to work as a registered representative for a member house, is not a "contract of employment"
within the meaning of Section 1).
222. See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Erving, 468 F.2d at 1067; Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310 (7th
Cir. 1981); Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1988); Fox v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 453 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
224. See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-58.
225. See, e.g., Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737-38.
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Civil Rights Acts,' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (until
Gilmer),m and occasionally the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),n although this last exception seems recently to have been implicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court.2
Although many of these cases have couched their decisions in statutory
construction terminology and argued that the statutes creating these claims
countermand the Arbitration Act, closer analysis reveals courts have used a public
policy exception in these cases which posits that arbitration does not do sufficient
justice to certain individual rights claims.2 I have previously argued that these
public policy arguments are invalid and that the statutory preemption claim is also
unpersuasive. What has driven all of these arbitration exceptions is a judicial
wariness of requiring arbitration where the forum appears to be disadvantageous
to a party that had relatively weak bargaining power and can not be said to have
meaningfully consented to the arbitration term. Although courts have ample
power under Section 2 of the Act to fashion a doctrine invalidating arbitration
agreements that lack sufficient consent, 23' they have largely failed to grasp this
opportunity, seemingly preferring to use the public policy exception 232 or to
force consumers and employees to arbitrate in situations where their "consent" to
the arbitration agreement seems illusory.
A broader interpretation of the types of workers protected from coercive
arbitration agreements through Section l's employment contract exception provides
226. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289-91 (holding claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not subject
to arbitration with reasoning applicable to all civil rights acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-85).
227. See, e.g., Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (8th Cir.
1988); Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227-28; Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543,
545-47 (D.NJ. 1987). But see Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d at 198-201 (rejecting
ADEA exception to arbitrabiity), affd, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (overruling ADEA exception cases).
228. See, e.g., Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834,849 (3d Cir. 1987); Bird v. Shearson
Lehman/American Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292,293 (2d Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct.
225 (1989), on remand, 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991); Lewis v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 273 (E.D. Pa. 1977). But see Sulit, 847
F.2d at 477; Fox, 453 F. Supp. at 563 (rejecting ERISA exception to arbitrability).
229. Bird, 871 F.2d at 293, an opinion taking a forceful view in favor of an ERISA exception to
arbitrability, was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, 110 S. Ct. 225, for reconsideration in
light of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., which overruled the longstanding
Wilko v. Swan exception to arbitration of claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 and
established a more stringent criteria for finding certain statutory claims exempt from arbitration.
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483. Although the almost strident approach of Bird may have been
what occasioned the remand, and although one can construct arguments for an ERISA exception more
tailored to the language of Rodriquez de Quijas, I regard the Supreme Court's action as invalidating
an ERISA exception to arbitrability. On remand, the Second Cicuit took a similar view and mandated
arbitration of ERISA claims. See Bird, 926 F.2d at 118, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991).
230. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 283-334; Sterk, supra note 9, at 538.
231. Section 2 of the Act provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
9 U.S.C. § 2; see Stempel, supra note 13, at 1426.
232. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 283-334.
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a more statutorily sound, less judicially activist means of satisfying the concerns
that covertly gave rise to the public policy exceptions and continue to trouble
critics of the Supreme Court's more recent "pro-arbitration" jurisprudence. By
grasping Section l's mantle, courts would protect disempowered employees not
because the judiciary, acting sua sponte, saw it as the right thing to do, but
because Congress has mandated it. The latter approach comports far better with
prevailing legal thought than does the public policy approach. Similarly,
recognition of the previously overlooked force of Section 1 provides a doctrinal
tool by which courts unmoved by contracting abuses are forced to act in favor of
employee rights.
To be sure, by giving Section 1 a broader interpretation, Courts are doing
more than rendering an obvious and ministerial application of Section 1.
However, as the preceding discussion regarding statutory interpretation suggests,
such judicial helpfulness to the legislature is now widely regarded as legitimate by
a diverse consensus of the profession. Certainly, the broad interpretation of
Section 1 is much less unfriendly to the legislative process than use of a public
policy exception. Although critics of the broad interpretation may argue that it is
up to Congress to amend the Act, this view ignores the difficulties posed in
getting access to the congressional agenda, especially when society's more
powerful political interests are opposed to a textual broadening of Section 1.
Besides, the bulk of statutory interpretation thought suggests that Congress already
wrote a broad Section 1 nearly 65 years ago but that courts unwisely and unfairly
constricted the reach of the employment contract exception.
Further, a broader interpretation of Section 1 protects all disempowered
workers, not merely those fortunate enough to make a claim under the limited
number of statutes given preferential treatment by the judiciary. At a time when
the Court has shown increasing disfavor toward public policy exceptions,
233
broader construction of Section 1 provides a more solid foundation for protecting
the rights of persons likely to be subjected to somewhat coercive arbitration
agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
One distinguished jurist, in a moment of hyperbole, stated that "one of the
dark chapters in legal history concerns the validity, interpretation, and enforceabili-
ty of arbitration agreements."234 Although I agree that many years of hostility
toward arbitration were hardly a credit to the judiciary, the "dark chapter" rhetoric
inappropriately elevates a century of poor arbitration doctrine to the status of some
233. See, e.g., Mitsubishi4 473 U.S. at 625 (rejecting antitrust exception to arbitrability); McMahon,
482 U.S. at 238 (rejecting 1934 Act securities exception); Rodriquez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483
(overruling 1933 Act securities law exception to arbitrability); Bird, 871 F.2d at 293, vacated and
remanded, 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989), on remand, 926 F.2d 116 (1991) (compelling arbitration), cert.
denied, 111 S. CL 2891 (1991).
234. Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 406 (Medina, J.).
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of the truly dark chapters in law (aid to slavery, 5 aid to segregation," assist-
ing the rise of Nazism, 7 insensitivity to women,238 internment of Japanese-
Americans,239 resistance to major social reforms) 2u  and thereby risks trivial-
izing these exceptionally dark moments. But although Section 1 doctrine does
not embarrass the bench as do decisions such as Dred Scot241 or Plessy v.
FergusonA2 neither is the law of Section 1 a credit to the courts.
The courts' narrow construction of the "workers engaged in commerce"
employment contract exception reveals a bench insufficiently able to grasp an
opportunity to render better, modern, public-regarding statutory interpretation that
would benefit potentially millions of workers in some small way. The bench has
missed this opportunity because its vision was too myopically focused on a
restricted and conventional statutory inquiry. With a wider, deeper, more
comprehensive vision of statutory interpretation, the Arbitration Act, and the
realities of modern employment, courts could substantially improve Arbitration Act
jurisprudence, alchemizing the employment contract exception of Section 1 and
this aspect of Arbitration Act jurisprudence from a gray chapter to one of law's
brighter pages.
235. See generally R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
236. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (tacitly overruled by Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
237. See I. MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: TIlE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 14-17 (D. Schneider,
trans. 1991) (sympathetic judges assisted the rise of Nazism in Germany by affording early Nazi
criminal dissidents lenient treatment but rigidly enforcing laws against leftists when Hitler and his allies
gained power); see also Posner, Courting Evil, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1991, at 36 (reviewing
Muller).
238. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting women right to vote in federal elections a mere 130
years after the founding of the nation).
239. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
240. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268 (invalidating child labor law as
unconstitutional) (overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941)).
241. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396 (1856) (holding former slave now claiming
freedman status not to be citizen for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction and that he remained a
slave notwithstanding residence in area where slavery was illegal).
242. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (finding state-mandated separation of races on railroad passenger trains
not to violate Equal Protection Clause).
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